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An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), epi-centred in Hubei Province of the People’s Republic of China, quickly spread worldwide and caused COVID-19 pandemic. It infected hundreds of millions of people and caused millions of deaths. In this paper, we develop a compartmental ODE model of COVID-19 transmission. We consider a possibility of breakthrough infections after the vaccination and account for both symptomatic and asymptomatic infections and transmissions. We also incorporate game theory to study the optimal vaccination decisions from the individuals’ perspective. We show that vaccination alone is unlikely to eliminate COVID-19. To achieve herd immunity, the individuals would have to receive a dose of a vaccine more frequently than once every 3 months. It is therefore crucial to adhere to various guidelines, such as quarantine, isolate and wear a mask if tested positive for COVID-19. 

Monkeypox (MPX) is a viral zoonotic disease that was endemic to Central and West Africa. However, during the first half of 2022, MPX spread to almost 60 countries all over the world. Smallpox vaccines are about 85% effective in preventing MPX infections. Our objective is to determine whether the vaccines should be mandated or whether voluntary use of the vaccine could be enough to stop the MPX outbreak. We incorporate a standard SVEIR compartmental model of MPX transmission into a game-theoretical framework. We study a vaccination game in which individuals decide whether or not to vaccinate by assessing their benefits and costs. We solve the game for Nash equilibria, i.e., the vaccination rates the individuals would likely adopt without any outside intervention. We show that, without vaccination, MPX can become endemic in previously non-endemic regions, including the United States. We also show that to “not vaccinate” is often an optimal solution from the individual’s perspective. Moreover, we demonstrate that, for some parameter values, there are multiple equilibria of the vaccination game, and they exhibit a backward bifurcation. Thus, without centrally mandated minimal vaccination rates, the population could easily revert to no vaccination scenario. 

Yellow fever is a vector-borne acute viral hemorrhagic disease. It is endemic in tropical areas of Africa and Latin America but demonstrated the potential for international spread during the 2016 outbreak in Luanda, Angola. Yellow fever can be prevented by vaccination, vector control, and avoiding mosquito bites. To account for human behavior in disease dynamics, we add a game-theoretic component to a recent compartmental model of yellow fever transmission. The self-interested individuals evaluate the risks of contracting yellow fever and choose to vaccinate or avoid the bites to minimize the overall costs. We find the Nash equilibria, the optimal levels of vaccination and bite protections if the individuals can decide on the use of only one of the prevention methods as well as when they can decide on the use of both of them. In the later case, we show that vaccination is the preferred method of protection from the individual standpoint and, in the Nash equilibrium, individuals use vaccination only. Our model predicts the vaccination coverage in Angola to be around 65%, which is in reasonable agreement with the empirical value of 68%. We also study whether voluntary prevention can lead to the elimination of the disease in endemic areas. We show that voluntary vaccination alone is not enough to mitigate the risks of outbreaks, suggesting that a mandatory vaccination policy is necessary. 

Yaws is a chronic infection that affects mainly the skin, bone and cartilage and spreads mostly between children. The new approval of a medication as treatment in 2012 has revived eradication efforts and now only few known localized foci of infection remain. The World Health Organization strategy mandates an initial round of total community treatment (TCT) with single-dose azithromycin followed either by further TCT or by total targeted treatment (TTT), an active case-finding and treatment of cases and their contacts. We develop the compartmental ODE model of yaws transmission and treatment for these scenarios. We solve for disease-free and endemic equilibria and also perform the stability analysis. We calibrate the model and validate its predictions on the data from Lihir Island in Papua New Guinea. We demonstrate that TTT strategy is efficient in preventing outbreaks but, due to the presence of asymptomatic latent cases, TTT will not eliminate yaws within a reasonable time frame. To achieve the 2030 eradication target, TCT should be applied instead.