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We initiate the study of error correcting codes over the multi-party adversarial broadcast channel. Specifically, we consider the classic information dissemination problem where n parties, each holding an input bit, wish to know each other’s input. For this, they communicate in rounds, where, in each round, one designated party sends a bit to all other parties over a channel governed by an adversary that may corrupt a constant fraction of the received communication. We mention that the dissemination problem was studied in the stochastic noise model since the 80’s. While stochastic noise in multi-party channels has received quite a bit of attention, the case of adversarial noise has largely been avoided, as such channels cannot handle more than a 1/n-fraction of errors. Indeed, this many errors allow an adversary to completely corrupt the incoming or outgoing communication for one of the parties and fail the protocol. Curiously, we show that by eliminating these "trivial" attacks, one can get a simple protocol resilient to a constant fraction of errors. Thus, a model that rules out such attacks is both necessary and sufficient to get a resilient protocol. The main shortcoming of our dissemination protocol is its length: it requires Θ(n²) communication rounds whereas n rounds suffice in the absence of noise. Our main result is a matching lower bound of Ω(n²) on the length of any dissemination protocol in our model. Our proof first "gets rid" of the channel noise by converting it to a form of "input noise", showing that a noisy dissemination protocol implies a (noiseless) protocol for a version of the direct sum gap-majority problem. We conclude the proof with a tight lower bound for the latter problem, which may be of independent interest. 

Let L be a language that can be decided in linear space and let ϵ>0 be any constant. Let A be the exponential hardness assumption that for every n, membership in L for inputs of length n cannot be decided by circuits of size smaller than 2ϵn. We prove that for every function f:{0,1}∗→{0,1}, computable by a randomized logspace algorithm R, there exists a deterministic logspace algorithm D (attempting to compute f), such that on every input x of length n, the algorithm D outputs one of the following:1)The correct value f(x).2)The string: “I am unable to compute f(x) because the hardness assumption A is false”, followed by a (provenly correct) circuit of size smaller than 2ϵn′ for membership in L for inputs of length n′, for some n′=Θ(logn); that is, a circuit that refutes A. Moreover, D is explicitly constructed, given R.We note that previous works on the hardness-versus-randomness paradigm give derandomized algorithms that rely blindly on the hardness assumption. If the hardness assumption is false, the algorithms may output incorrect values, and thus a user cannot trust that an output given by the algorithm is correct. Instead, our algorithm D verifies the computation so that it never outputs an incorrect value. Thus, if D outputs a value for f(x), that value is certified to be correct. Moreover, if D does not output a value for f(x), it alerts that the hardness assumption was found to be false, and refutes the assumption.Our next result is a universal derandomizer for BPL (the class of problems solvable by bounded-error randomized logspace algorithms) 1 : We give a deterministic algorithm U that takes as an input a randomized logspace algorithm R and an input x and simulates the computation of R on x, deteriministically. Under the widely believed assumption BPL=L, the space ...