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  4. We study the spectral gap of subgraphs of the hypercube induced by monotone subsets of vertices. For a monotone subset A ⊆ {0, 1}n of density μ(A), the previous best lower bound on the spectral gap, due to Cohen [Coh16], was γ ≳ μ(A)/n2, improving upon the earlier bound γ ≳ μ(A)2/n2 established by Ding and Mossel [DM14]. In this paper, we prove the optimal lower bound γ ≳ μ(A)/n. As a corollary, we improve the mixing time upper bound of the random walk on constant-density monotone sets from O(n3), as shown by Ding and Mossel, to O(n2). Along the way, we develop two new inequalities that may be of independent interest: (1) a directed L2-Poincar´e inequality on the hypercube, and (2) an “approximate” FKG inequality for monotone sets 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available August 11, 2026
  5. This paper introduces the concept of leakage-robust Bayesian persuasion. Situated between public Bayesian persuasion and private Bayesian persuasion, leakage-robust persuasion considers a setting where one or more signals privately communicated by a sender to the receivers may be leaked. We study the design of leakage-robust Bayesian persuasion schemes and quantify the price of robustness using two formalisms: - The first notion, k-worst-case persuasiveness, requires a signaling scheme to remain persuasive as long as each receiver observes no more than k leaked signals from other receivers. We quantify the Price of Robust Persuasiveness (PoRPk)— i.e., the gap in sender's utility as compared to the optimal private persuasion scheme—as Θ(min{2k,n}) for supermodular sender utilities and Θ(k) for submodular or XOS sender utilities, where n is the number of receivers. This result also establishes that in some instances, Θ(log k) leakages are sufficient for the utility of the optimal leakage-robust persuasion to degenerate to that of public persuasion. - The second notion, expected downstream utility robustness, relaxes the persuasiveness requirement and instead considers the impact on sender's utility resulting from receivers best responding to their observations. By quantifying the Price of Robust Downstream Utility (PoRU) as the gap between the sender's expected utility over the randomness in the leakage pattern as compared to private persuasion, our results show that, over several natural and structured distributions of leakage patterns, PoRU improves PoRP to Θ(k) or even Θ(1), where k is the maximum number of leaked signals observable to each receiver across leakage patterns in the distribution. En route to these results, we show that subsampling and masking serve as general-purpose algorithmic paradigms for transforming any private persuasion signaling scheme to one that is leakage-robust, with minmax optimal loss in sender's utility. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.16624. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available July 7, 2026
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  10. Calibration measures quantify how much a forecaster’s predictions violate calibration, which requires that forecasts are unbiased conditioning on the forecasted probabilities. Two important desiderata for a calibration measure are its decision-theoretic implications (i.e., downstream decision-makers that best respond to the forecasts are always no-regret) and its truthfulness (i.e., a forecaster approximately minimizes error by always reporting the true probabilities). Existing measures satisfy at most one of the properties, but not both. We introduce a new calibration measure termed subsampled step calibration, StepCEsub, that is both decision-theoretic and truthful. In particular, on any product distribution, StepCEsub is truthful up to an O(1) factor whereas prior decision-theoretic calibration measures suffer from an e−Ω(T)–Ω(T−−√) truthfulness gap. Moreover, in any smoothed setting where the conditional probability of each event is perturbed by a noise of magnitude c>0, StepCEsub is truthful up to an O(log(1/c)−−−−−−−√) factor, while prior decision-theoretic measures have an e−Ω(T)–Ω(T1/3) truthfulness gap. We also prove a general impossibility result for truthful decision-theoretic forecasting: any complete and decision-theoretic calibration measure must be discontinuous and non-truthful in the non-smoothed setting. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available June 30, 2026