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Work on scaling laws has found that large language models (LMs) show predictable improvements to overall loss with increased scale (model size, training data, and compute). Here, we present evidence for the claim that LMs may show inverse scaling, or worse task performance with increased scale, e.g., due to flaws in the training objective and data. We present empirical evidence of inverse scaling on 11 datasets collected by running a public contest, the Inverse Scaling Prize, with a substantial prize pool. Through analysis of the datasets, along with other examples found in the literature, we identify four potential causes of inverse scaling: (i) preference to repeat memorized sequences over following in-context instructions, (ii) imitation of undesirable patterns in the training data, (iii) tasks containing an easy distractor task which LMs could focus on, rather than the harder real task, and (iv) correct but misleading few-shot demonstrations of the task. We release the winning datasets at https://inversescaling.com/data to allow for further investigation of inverse scaling. Our tasks have helped drive the discovery of U-shaped and inverted-U scaling trends, where an initial trend reverses, suggesting that scaling trends are less reliable at predicting the behavior of larger-scale models than previously understood. Overall, our results suggest that there are tasks for which increased model scale alone may not lead to progress, and that more careful thought needs to go into the data and objectives for training language models. 

The potential for pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to use natural language feedback at inference time has been an exciting recent development. We build upon this observation by formalizing an algorithm for learning from natural language feedback at training time instead, which we call Imitation learning from Language Feedback (ILF). ILF requires only a small amount of human-written feedback during training and does not require the same feedback at test time, making it both user-friendly and sample-efficient. We further show that ILF can be seen as a form of minimizing the KL divergence to the target distribution and demonstrate proof-of-concepts on text summarization and program synthesis tasks. For code generation, ILF improves a Codegen-Mono 6.1B model’s pass@1 rate from 22% to 36% on the MBPP benchmark, outperforming both fine-tuning on MBPP and on human- written repaired programs. For summarization, we show that ILF can be combined with learning from human preferences to improve a GPT-3 model’s summarization performance to be comparable to human quality, outperforming fine-tuning on human-written summaries. Overall, our results suggest that ILF is both more effective and sample-efficient than training exclusively on demonstrations for improving an LLM’s performance on a variety of tasks. 

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved widespread success on a variety of in-context few shot tasks, but this success is typically evaluated via correctness rather than consistency. We argue that self-consistency is an important criteria for valid multi-step reasoning in tasks where the solution is composed of the answers to multiple sub-steps. We propose two types of self consistency that are particularly important for multi-step reasoning – hypothetical consistency (a model’s ability to predict what its output would be in a hypothetical other context) and compositional consistency (consistency of a model’s final outputs when intermediate sub-steps are replaced with the model’s outputs for those steps). We demonstrate that multiple variants of the GPT-3/-4 models exhibit poor consistency rates across both types of consistency on a variety of tasks. 

Work on scaling laws has found that large language models (LMs) show predictable improvements to overall loss with increased scale (model size, training data, and compute). Here, we present evidence for the claim that LMs may show inverse scaling, or worse task performance with increased scale, e.g., due to flaws in the training objective and data. We present empirical evidence of inverse scaling on 11 datasets collected by running a public contest, the Inverse Scaling Prize, with a substantial prize pool. Through analysis of the datasets, along with other examples found in the literature, we identify four potential causes of inverse scaling: (i) preference to repeat memorized sequences over following in-context instructions, (ii) imitation of undesirable patterns in the training data, (iii) tasks containing an easy distractor task which LMs could focus on, rather than the harder real task, and (iv) correct but misleading few-shot demonstrations of the task. We release the winning datasets at inversescaling.com/data to allow for further investigation of inverse scaling. Our tasks have helped drive the discovery of U-shaped and inverted-U scaling trends, where an initial trend reverses, suggesting that scaling trends are less reliable at predicting the behavior of larger-scale models than previously understood. Overall, our results suggest that there are tasks for which increased model scale alone may not lead to progress, and that more careful thought needs to go into the data and objectives for training language models. 

Language models (LMs) are pretrained to imitate internet text, including content that would violate human preferences if generated by an LM: falsehoods, offensive comments, personally identifiable information, low-quality or buggy code, and more. Here, we explore alternative objectives for pretraining LMs in a way that also guides them to generate text aligned with human preferences. We benchmark five objectives for pretraining with human feedback across three tasks and study how they affect the trade-off between alignment and capabilities of pretrained LMs. We find a Pareto optimal and simple approach among those we explored: conditional training, or learning distribution over tokens conditional on their human preference scores given by a reward model. Conditional training reduces the rate of undesirable content by up to an order of magnitude, both when generating without a prompt and with an adversarially chosen prompt. Moreover, conditional training maintains the downstream task performance of standard LM pretraining, both before and after task-specific finetuning. Pretraining with human feedback results in much better preference satisfaction than standard LM pretraining followed by finetuning with feedback, i.e., learning and then unlearning undesirable behavior. Our results suggest that we should move beyond imitation learning when pretraining LMs and incorporate human preferences from the start of training. 

Naturally-occurring information-seeking questions often contain questionable assumptions -- assumptions that are false or unverifiable. Questions containing questionable assumptions are challenging because they require a distinct answer strategy that deviates from typical answers to information-seeking questions. For instance, the question "When did Marie Curie discover Uranium?" cannot be answered as a typical when question without addressing the false assumption "Marie Curie discovered Uranium". In this work, we propose (QA)2 (Question Answering with Questionable Assumptions), an open-domain evaluation dataset consisting of naturally-occurring search engine queries that may or may not contain questionable assumptions. To be successful on (QA)2, systems must be able to detect questionable assumptions and also be able to produce adequate responses for both typical information-seeking questions and ones with questionable assumptions. We find that current models do struggle with handling questionable assumptions -- the best performing model achieves 59% human rater acceptability on abstractive QA with (QA)2 questions, leaving substantial headroom for progress. 

Language models (LMs) are pretrained to imitate text from large and diverse datasets that contain content that would violate human preferences if generated by an LM: falsehoods, offensive comments, personally identifiable information, low-quality or buggy code, among others. Here, we explore alternative objectives for pretraining LMs in a way that also guides them to generate text aligned with human preferences. We benchmark five objectives for pretraining with human feedback across three tasks and study how they affect the alignment and capabilities of pretrained LMs. We find a Pareto-optimal and simple approach among those we explored: conditional training, or learning distribution over tokens conditional on their human preference scores. Conditional training reduces the rate of undesirable content by up to an order of magnitude, both when generating without a prompt and with an adversarially-chosen prompt. Moreover, conditional training maintains the downstream task performance of standard LM pretraining, both before and after task-specific finetuning. Pretraining with human feedback results in much better preference satisfaction than standard LM pretraining followed by finetuning with feedback, i.e., learning and then unlearning undesirable behavior. Our results suggest that we should move beyond imitation learning when pretraining LMs and incorporate human preferences from the start of training. 

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM’s process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs’ predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model’s prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs—e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always “(A)”—which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods. 

Large language models (LLMs) that do not give consistent answers across contexts are problematic when used for tasks with expectations of consistency–e.g. question-answering, explanations, etc. Our work presents an evaluation benchmark for self-consistency in cases of under-specification where two or more answers can be correct. We conduct a series of behavioral experiments on the OpenAI model suite using an ambiguous integer sequence completion task. We find that average consistency ranges from 67% to 82%, far higher than would be predicted if a model’s consistency was random, and increases as model capability improves. Furthermore, we show that models tend to maintain self-consistency across a series of robustness checks, including prompting speaker changes and sequence length changes. These results suggest that self- consistency arises as an emergent capability without specifically training for it. Despite this, we find that models are uncalibrated when judging their own consistency, with models display- ing both over- and under-confidence. We also propose a nonparametric test for determining from token output distribution whether a model assigns non-trivial probability to alternative answers. Using this test, we find that despite increases in self-consistency, models usually place significant weight on alternative, inconsistent answers. This distribution of probability mass provides evidence that even highly self- consistent models internally compute multiple possible responses.