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Abstract We develop alternative families of Bayes factors for use in hypothesis tests as alternatives to the popular default Bayes factors. The alternative Bayes factors are derived for the statistical analyses most commonly used in psychological research – one-sample and two-samplet tests, regression, and ANOVA analyses. They possess the same desirable theoretical and practical properties as the default Bayes factors and satisfy additional theoretical desiderata while mitigating against two features of the default priors that we consider implausible. They can be conveniently computed via an R package that we provide. Furthermore, hypothesis tests based on Bayes factors and those based on significance tests are juxtaposed. This discussion leads to the insight that default Bayes factors as well as the alternative Bayes factors are equivalent to test-statistic-based Bayes factors as proposed by Johnson.Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology,67, 689–701. (2005). We highlight test-statistic-based Bayes factors as a general approach to Bayes-factor computation that is applicable to many hypothesis-testing problems for which an effect-size measure has been proposed and for which test power can be computed. 

Abstract This commentary argues against the indictment of current experimental practices such as piecemeal testing, and the proposed integrated experiment design (IED) approach, which we see as yet another attempt at automating scientific thinking. We identify a number of undesirable features of IED that lead us to believe that its broad application will hinder scientific progress. 

Abstract van Doorn et al. (2021) outlined various questions that arise when conducting Bayesian model comparison for mixed effects models. Seven response articles offered their own perspective on the preferred setup for mixed model comparison, on the most appropriate specification of prior distributions, and on the desirability of default recommendations. This article presents a round-table discussion that aims to clarify outstanding issues, explore common ground, and outline practical considerations for any researcher wishing to conduct a Bayesian mixed effects model comparison. 

In recent years, discussions comparing high-threshold and continuous accounts of recognition-memory judgments have increasingly turned their attention toward critical testing. One of the de ning features of this approach is its requirement for the relationship between theoretical assumptions and predictions to be laid out in a transparent and precise way. One of the (fortunate) consequences of this requirement is that it encourages researchers to debate the merits of the different assumptions at play. The present work addresses a recent attempt to overturn the dismissal of high-threshold models by getting rid of a background selective- in uence assumption. However, it can be shown that the contrast process proposed to explain this violation undermines a more general assumption that we dubbed“single-item generalization.” We argue that the case for the dismissal of these assumptions and the claimed support for the proposed high-threshold contrast account does not stand the scrutiny of their theoretical properties and empirical implications. 

In everyday life, people routinely make decisions that involve irredeemable risks such as death (e.g., while driving). Even though these decisions under extinction risk are common, practically important, and have different properties compared to the types of decisions typically studied by decision scientists, they have received little research attention. The present work advances the formal understanding of decision making under extinction risk by introducing a novel experimental paradigm, the Extinction Gambling Task (EGT). We derive optimal strategies for three different types of extinction and near-extinction events, and compare them to participants’ choices in three experiments. Leveraging computational modelling to describe strategies at the individual level, we document strengths and shortcomings in participants’ decisions under extinction risk. Specifically, we find that, while participants are relatively good in terms of the qualitative strategies they employ, their decisions are nevertheless affected by loss chasing, scope insensitivity, and opportunity cost neglect. We hope that by formalising decisions under extinction risk and providing a task to study them, this work will facilitate future research on an important topic that has been largely ignored. 

Measurement literacy is required for strong scientific reasoning, effective experimental design, conceptual and empirical validation of measurement quantities, and the intelligible interpretation of error in theory construction. This discourse examines how issues in measurement are posed and resolved and addresses potential misunderstandings. Examples drawn from across the sciences are used to show that measurement literacy promotes the goals of scientific discourse and provides the necessary foundation for carving out perspectives and carrying out interventions in science. 

Decisions about extinction risks are ubiquitous in everyday life and for our continued existence as a species. We introduce a new risky-choice task that can be used to study this topic: The Extinction Gambling Task. Here, we investigate two versions of this task: a Keep variant, where participants cannot accumulate any more earnings after the extinction event, and a Lose variant, where extinction also wipes out all previous earnings. We derive optimal solutions for both variants and compare them to behavioural data. Our findings suggest that people understand the difference between the two variants and their behaviour is qualitatively in line with the optimal solution. Further, we find evidence for risk-aversion in the Keep condition but not in the Lose condition. We hope that this task can facilitate further research on this vital topic. 

The ability to distinguish between different explanations of human memory abilities continues to be the subject of many ongoing theoretical debates. These debates attempt to account for a growing corpus of empirical phenomena in item-memory judgments, which include the list strength effect, the strength-based mirror effect, and output interference. One of the main theoretical contenders is the Retrieving Effectively from Memory (REM) model. We show that REM, in its current form, has difficulties in accounting for source-memory judgments – a situation that calls for its revision. We propose an extended REM model that assumes a local-matching process for source judgments alongside source differentiation. We report a first evaluation of this model’s predictions using three experiments in which we manipulated the relative source-memory strength of different lists of items. Analogous to item-memory judgments, we observed a null list strength effect and a strength-based mirror effect in the case of source memory. In a second evaluation, which relied on a novel experiment alongside two previously published datasets, we evaluated the model’s predictions regarding the manifestation of output interference in item and lack of it in source memory judgments. Our results showed output interference severely affecting the accuracy of item-memory judgments but having a null or negligible impact when it comes to source-memory judgments. Altogether, these results support REM’s core notion of differentiation (for both item and source information) as well as the concept of local matching proposed by the present extension. 

Individuals’ decisions under risk tend to be in line with the notion that“losses loom larger than gains.” This loss aversion in decision making is commonly understood as a stable individual preference that is manifested across different contexts. The presumed stability and generality, which underlies the prominence of loss aversion in the literature at large, has been recently questioned by studies reporting how loss aversion can disappear, and even reverse, as a function of the choice context. The present study investigated whether loss aversion re ects a trait-like attitude of avoiding losses or rather individuals’ adaptability to different con- texts. We report three experiments investigating the within-subject context sensitivity of loss aversion in a two-alternative forced-choice task. Our results show that the choice context can shift people’s loss aversion, though somewhat inconsistently. Moreover, individual estimates of loss aversion are shown to have a con- siderable degree of stability. Altogether, these results indicate that even though the absolute value of loss aversion can be affected by external factors such as the choice context, estimates of people’s loss aversion still capture the relative dispositions toward gains and losses across individuals.