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Existing algorithms for online conformal prediction -- guaranteeing marginal coverage in adversarial settings -- are variants of online gradient descent (OGD), but their analyses of worst-case coverage do not follow from the regret guarantee of OGD. What is the relationship between no-regret learning and online conformal prediction? We observe that although standard regret guarantees imply marginal coverage in i.i.d. settings, this connection fails as soon as we either move to adversarial environments or ask for group conditional coverage. On the other hand, we show a tight connection between threshold calibrated coverage and swap-regret in adversarial settings, which extends to group-conditional (multi-valid) coverage. We also show that algorithms in the follow the perturbed leader family of no regret learning algorithms (which includes online gradient descent) can be used to give group-conditional coverage guarantees in adversarial settings for arbitrary grouping functions. Via this connection we analyze and conduct experiments using a multi-group generalization of the ACI algorithm of Gibbs & Candes [2021] 

In traditional reinforcement learning (RL), the learner aims to solve a single objective optimization problem: find the policy that maximizes expected reward. However, in many real-world settings, it is important to optimize over multiple objectives simultaneously. For example, when we are interested in fairness, states might have feature annotations corresponding to multiple (intersecting) demographic groups to whom reward accrues, and our goal might be to maximize the reward of the group receiving the minimal reward. In this work, we consider a multi-objective optimization problem in which each objective is defined by a state-based reweighting of a single scalar reward function. This generalizes the problem of maximizing the reward of the minimum reward group. We provide oracle-efficient algorithms to solve these multi-objective RL problems even when the number of objectives is exponentially large-for tabular MDPs, as well as for large MDPs when the group functions have additional structure. Finally, we experimentally validate our theoretical results and demonstrate applications on a preferential attachment graph MDP. 

We give an efficient reduction through which any machine learning algorithm can be converted into an interactive protocol that can interact with another party (such as a human) to reach agreement on predictions and improve accuracy. The requirements on each party are calibration conditions which are computationally and statistically tractable relaxations of Bayesian rationality --- that are sensible even in prior free settings --- and hence are a substantial generalization of Aumann's classic ``agreement theorem''. In the interactive protocol, the machine learning model first produces a prediction. Then, the human responds to the model's prediction by either conveying agreement, or else providing feedback of some sort. The model then updates its state and provides a new prediction, and the human in turn may update their beliefs. The process continues until the model and the human reach agreement. The first setting we study generalizes past work on Aumann's Agreement Theorem, in which the parties aim to agree on a one-dimensional expectation. At each round, each party simply communicates an estimate of their current prediction for the expectation. In this setting we recover the quantitative convergence theorem of [Aaronson, 2005] (but under our much weaker assumptions). We then move on to the case in which the parties maintain beliefs about a distribution over d outcomes and consider two feedback mechanisms. The first simply corresponds to a vector-valued estimate of the agents' current prediction. The second takes a decision theoretic perspective: if the human needs to take some downstream action from a finite set, and has an arbitrary utility function of their action and the outcome, then we show that the parties can communicate and reach agreement about the correct downstream action to take by simply communicating at each round the action that they believe to be utility maximizing. The number of rounds until agreement remains independent of $$d$$ in this case. We can also generalize our protocols to more than 2 parties, with computational complexity that degrades only linearly with the number of parties. Our protocols are based on simple, efficiently maintainable conditions and result in predictions that are more accurate than any single party's alone. 

Blasiok et al. [2023] proposed distance to calibration as a natural measure of calibration error that unlike expected calibration error (ECE) is continuous. Recently, Qiao and Zheng [2024] gave a non-constructive argument establishing the existence of an online predictor that can obtain O(√T ) distance to calibration in the adversarial setting, which is known to be impossible for ECE. They leave as an open problem finding an explicit, efficient algorithm. We resolve this problem and give an extremely simple, efficient, deterministic algorithm that obtains distance to calibration error at most 2√T . 

There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish their competitors who refuse to support high prices, and these strategies can be automatically learned. In fact, a standard economic intuition is that supra-competitive prices emerge from either the use of threats, or a failure of one party to optimize their payoff. Is this intuition correct? Would preventing threats in algorithmic decision-making prevent supra-competitive prices when sellers are optimizing for their own revenue? No. We show that supra-competitive prices can emerge even when both players are using algorithms which do not encode threats, and which optimize for their own revenue. We study sequential pricing games in which a first mover deploys an algorithm and then a second mover optimizes within the resulting environment. We show that if the first mover deploys any algorithm with a no-regret guarantee, and then the second mover even approximately optimizes within this now static environment, monopoly-like prices arise. The result holds for any no-regret learning algorithm deployed by the first mover and for any pricing policy of the second mover that obtains them profit at least as high as a random pricing would -- and hence the result applies even when the second mover is optimizing only within a space of non-responsive pricing distributions which are incapable of encoding threats. In fact, there exists a set of strategies, neither of which explicitly encode threats that form a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous pricing game in algorithm space, and lead to near monopoly prices. This suggests that the definition of ``algorithmic collusion'' may need to be expanded, to include strategies without explicitly encoded threats. 

In this paper, we focus on the problem of conformal prediction with conditional guarantees. Prior work has shown that it is impossible to construct nontrivial prediction sets with full conditional coverage guarantees. A wealth of research has considered relaxations of full conditional guarantees, relying on some predefined uncertainty structures. Departing from this line of thinking, we propose Partition Learning Conformal Prediction (PLCP), a framework to improve conditional validity of prediction sets through learning uncertainty-guided features from the calibration data. We implement PLCP efficiently with alternating gradient descent, utilizing off-the-shelf machine learning models. We further analyze PLCP theoretically and provide conditional guarantees for infinite and finite sample sizes. Finally, our experimental results over four real-world and synthetic datasets show the superior performance of PLCP compared to state-of-the-art methods in terms of coverage and length in both classification and regression scenarios.