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Abstract We introduce an arbitrage‐free framework for robust valuation adjustments. An investor trades a credit default swap portfolio with a risky counterparty, and hedges credit risk by taking a position in defaultable bonds. The investor does not know the exact return rate of her counterparty's bond, but she knows it lies within an uncertainty interval. We derive both upper and lower bounds for the XVA process of the portfolio, and show that these bounds may be recovered as solutions of nonlinear ordinary differential equations. The presence of collateralization and closeout payoffs leads to important differences with respect to classical credit risk valuation. The value of the super‐replicating portfolio cannot be directly obtained by plugging one of the extremes of the uncertainty interval in the valuation equation, but rather depends on the relation between the XVA replicating portfolio and the closeout value throughout the life of the transaction. Our comparative statics analysis indicates that credit contagion has a nonlinear effect on the replication strategies and on the XVA.
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Credit portfolio selection with decaying contagion intensities
Abstract We develop a fixed‐income portfolio framework capturing the exponential decay of contagious intensities between successive default events. We show that the value function of the control problem is the classical solution to a recursive system of second‐order uniformly parabolic Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman partial differential equations. We analyze the interplay between risk premia, decay of default intensities, and their volatilities. Our comparative statics analysis finds that the investor chooses to go long only if he is capturing enough risk premia. If the default intensities deteriorate faster, the investor increases the size of his position if he goes short, or reduces the size of his position if he goes long.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1716145
- PAR ID:
- 10051457
- Publisher / Repository:
- Wiley-Blackwell
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Mathematical Finance
- Volume:
- 29
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 0960-1627
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- p. 137-173
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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