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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) consist of embedded computers with sensing and actuation capability, and are integrated into and tightly coupled with a physical system. Because the physical and cyber components of the system are tightly coupled, cyber-security is important for ensuring the system functions properly and safely. However, the effects of a cyberattack on the whole system may be difficult to determine, analyze, and therefore detect and mitigate. This work presents a model based software development framework integrated with a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for rapidly deploying CPS attack experiments. The framework provides the ability to emulate low level attacks and obtain platform specific performance measurements that are difficult to obtain in a traditional simulation environment. The framework improves the cybersecurity design process which can become more informed and customized to the production environment of a CPS. The developed framework is illustrated with a case study of a railway transportation system.
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Integrated simulation testbed for security and resilience of CPS
Owing1 to an immense growth of internet-connected and learning-enabled cyber-physical systems (CPSs) [1], several new types of attack vectors have emerged. Analyzing security and resilience of these complex CPSs is difficult as it requires evaluating many subsystems and factors in an integrated manner. Integrated simulation of physical systems and communication network can provide an underlying framework for creating a reusable and configurable testbed for such analyses. Using a model-based integration approach and the IEEE High-Level Architecture (HLA) [2] based distributed simulation software; we have created a testbed for integrated evaluation of large-scale CPS systems. Our tested supports web-based collaborative metamodeling and modeling of CPS system and experiments and a cloud computing environment for executing integrated networked co-simulations. A modular and extensible cyber-attack library enables validating the CPS under a variety of configurable cyber-attacks, such as DDoS and integrity attacks. Hardware-in-the-loop simulation is also supported along with several hardware attacks. Further, a scenario modeling language allows modeling of alternative paths (Courses of Actions) that enables validating CPS under different what-if scenarios as well as conducting cyber-gaming experiments. These capabilities make our testbed well suited for analyzing security and resilience of CPS. In addition, the web-based modeling and cloud-hosted execution infrastructure enables one to exercise the entire testbed using simply a web-browser, with integrated live experimental results display.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1743772
- PAR ID:
- 10076129
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 368 to 374
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3167132.3167173
