Theory of Mind enables us to represent and reason about other people's mental states like beliefs and knowledge. By considering what other people know, this allows us to strategically construct believable lies. Previous work has shown that people construct lies to be consistent with others' beliefs even when those beliefs differ from their own. However, in most real world cases, we don't know everything that the other person knows. We propose that to produce believable lies, the sender considers what private information the receiver may have. Here, we develop our theory into a computational model and test it in a novel paradigm that allows us to distinguish between knowledge shared between the lie sender and receiver and knowledge private to the receiver. Our main model successfully captures how people lie in this paradigm over alternative models. Overall, our work furthers our understanding of human social cognition in adversarial situations.
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Designing good deception: Recursive theory of mind in lying and lie detection
The human ability to deceive others and detect deception has long been tied to theory of mind. We make a stronger argument: in order to be adept liars – to balance gain (i.e. maximizing their own reward) and plausibility (i.e. maintaining a realistic lie) – humans calibrate their lies under the assumption that their partner is a rational, utility-maximizing agent. We develop an adversarial recursive Bayesian model that aims to formalize the behaviors of liars and lie detectors. We compare this model to (1) a model that does not perform theory of mind computations and (2) a model that has perfect knowledge of the opponent’s behavior. To test these models, we introduce a novel dyadic, stochastic game, allowing for quantitative measures of lies and lie detection. In a second experiment, we vary the ground truth probability. We find that our rational models qualitatively predict human lying and lie detecting behavior better than the non-rational model. Our findings suggest that humans control for the extremeness of their lies in a manner reflective of rational social inference. These findings provide a new paradigm and formal framework for nuanced quantitative analysis of the role of rationality and theory of mind in lying and lie detecting behavior.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1749551
- PAR ID:
- 10101193
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- The Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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