Title: Understanding the Security of Traffic Signal Infrastructure
With the proliferation of using smart and connected devices in the transportation domain, these systems inevitably face security threats from the real world. In this work, we analyze the security of the existing traffic signal systems and summarize the security implications exposed in our analysis. Our research shows that the deployed traffic signal systems can be easily manipulated with physical/remote access and are vulnerable to an array of real-world attacks such as a diversionary tactic. By setting up a standard traffic signal system locally in our lab and partnering with a municipality, we demonstrate that not only can traffic intersections be manipulated to show deadly traffic patterns such as all-direction green lights, but traffic control systems are also susceptible to ransomware and disruption attacks. Through testing and studying these attacks, we provide our security recommendations and mitigations to these threats. more »« less
Korobeinikov, Dmitrii; Chuprov, Sergei; Zatsarenko, Raman; Reznik, Leon
(, 19th Annual Symposium on Information Assurance (ASIA’ 24) , June 4-5, 2024, Albany, NY)
Goal, S
(Ed.)
Machine Learning models are widely utilized in a variety of applications, including Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). As these systems are operating in highly dynamic environments, they are exposed to numerous security threats that cause Data Quality (DQ) variations. Among such threats are network attacks that may cause data losses. We evaluate the influence of these factors on the image DQ and consequently on the image ML model performance. We propose and investigate Federated Learning (FL) as the way to enhance the overall level of privacy and security in ITS, as well as to improve ML model robustness to possible DQ variations in real-world applications. Our empirical study conducted with traffic sign images and YOLO, VGG16 and ResNet models proved the greater robustness of FL-based architecture over a centralized one.
Feng, X; Liao, X; Wang, X; Wang, H; Li, Q; Yang, K; Zhu, H; Sun, L.
(, SEC'19: Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium)
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Internet-of-Things (IoT) based cyber attacks. These attacks, as expected, are launched from compromised IoT devices by exploiting security flaws already known. Less clear, however, are the fundamental causes of the pervasiveness of IoT device vulnerabilities and their security implications, particularly in how they affect ongoing cybercrimes. To better understand the problems and seek effective means to suppress the wave of IoT-based attacks, we conduct a comprehensive study based on a large number of real-world attack traces collected from our honeypots, attack tools purchased from the underground, and information collected from high-profile IoT attacks. This study sheds new light on the device vulnerabilities of today's IoT systems and their security implications: ongoing cyber attacks heavily rely on these known vulnerabilities and the attack code released through their reports; on the other hand, such a reliance on known vulnerabilities can actually be used against adversaries. The same bug reports that enable the development of an attack at an exceedingly low cost can also be leveraged to extract vulnerability-specific features that help stop the attack. In particular, we leverage Natural Language Processing (NLP) to automatically collect and analyze more than 7,500 security reports (with 12,286 security critical IoT flaws in total) scattered across bug-reporting blogs, forums, and mailing lists on the Internet. We show that signatures can be automatically generated through an NLP-based report analysis, and be used by intrusion detection or firewall systems to effectively mitigate the threats from today's IoT-based attacks.
Feng, X; Liao, X; Wang, X; Wang, H; Li, Q; Yang, K; Zhu, H; Sun, L.
(, SEC'19: Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium)
Recent years have witnessed the rise of Internet-of-Things (IoT) based cyber attacks. These attacks, as expected, are launched from compromised IoT devices by exploiting security flaws already known. Less clear, however, are the fundamental causes of the pervasiveness of IoT device vulnerabilities and their security implications, particularly in how they affect ongoing cybercrimes. To better understand the problems and seek effective means to suppress the wave of IoT-based attacks, we conduct a comprehensive study based on a large number of real-world attack traces collected from our honeypots, attack tools purchased from the underground, and information collected from high-profile IoT attacks. This study sheds new light on the device vulnerabilities of today’s IoT systems and their security implications: ongoing cyber attacks heavily rely on these known vulnerabilities and the attack code released through their reports; on the other hand, such a reliance on known vulnerabilities can actually be used against adversaries. The same bug reports that enable the development of an attack at an exceedingly low cost can also be leveraged to extract vulnerability-specific features that help stop the attack. In particular, we leverage Natural Language Processing (NLP) to automatically collect and analyze more than 7,500 security reports (with 12,286 security critical IoT flaws in total) scattered across bug-reporting blogs, forums, and mailing lists on the Internet. We show that signatures can be automatically generated through an NLP-based report analysis, and be used by intrusion detection or firewall systems to effectively mitigate the threats from today’s IoT-based attacks.
Yang, He; Yang, Bowen; Coshatt, Stephen; Li, Qi; Hu, Kun; Hammond, Bryan Cooper; Ye, Jin; Parasuraman, Ramviyas; Song, Wenzhan
(, IEEE Journal of Emerging and Selected Topics in Power Electronics)
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed’s capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed’s security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms.
Connected vehicle (CV) technology brings both opportunities and challenges to the traffic signal control (TSC) system. While safety and mobility performance could be greatly improved by adopting CV technologies, the connectivity between vehicles and transportation infrastructure may increase the risks of cyber threats. In the past few years, studies related to cybersecurity on the TSC systems were conducted. However, there still lacks a systematic investigation that provides a comprehensive analysis framework. In this study, our aim is to fill the research gap by proposing a comprehensive analysis framework for the cybersecurity problem of the TSC in the CV environment. With potential threats towards the major components of the system and their corresponding impacts on safety and efficiency analyzed, data spoofing attack is considered the most plausible and realistic attack approach. Based on this finding, different attack strategies and defense solutions are discussed. A case study is presented to show the impact of the data spoofing attacks towards a selected CV based TSC system and corresponding mitigation countermeasures. This case study is conducted on a hybrid security testing platform, with virtual traffic and a real V2X communication network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to present a comprehensive analysis framework to the cybersecurity problem of the CV-based TSC systems.
Ning, Z., Zhang, F., and Remias, S. Understanding the Security of Traffic Signal Infrastructure. Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10108686. Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA) . Web. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_8.
Ning, Z., Zhang, F., & Remias, S. Understanding the Security of Traffic Signal Infrastructure. Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA), (). Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10108686. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_8
@article{osti_10108686,
place = {Country unknown/Code not available},
title = {Understanding the Security of Traffic Signal Infrastructure},
url = {https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10108686},
DOI = {10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_8},
abstractNote = {With the proliferation of using smart and connected devices in the transportation domain, these systems inevitably face security threats from the real world. In this work, we analyze the security of the existing traffic signal systems and summarize the security implications exposed in our analysis. Our research shows that the deployed traffic signal systems can be easily manipulated with physical/remote access and are vulnerable to an array of real-world attacks such as a diversionary tactic. By setting up a standard traffic signal system locally in our lab and partnering with a municipality, we demonstrate that not only can traffic intersections be manipulated to show deadly traffic patterns such as all-direction green lights, but traffic control systems are also susceptible to ransomware and disruption attacks. Through testing and studying these attacks, we provide our security recommendations and mitigations to these threats.},
journal = {Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA)},
author = {Ning, Z. and Zhang, F. and Remias, S.},
}
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