The value of information (VoI) provides a rational metric to assess the impact of data in decision processes, including maintenance of engineering systems. According to the principle that “information never hurts”, VoI is guaranteed to be non-negative when a single agent aims at minimizing an expected cost. However, in other contexts such as non-cooperative games, where agents compete against each other, revealing a piece of information to all agents may have a negative impact to some of them, as the negative effect of the competitors being informed and adjusting their policies surpasses the direct VoI. Being aware of this, some agents prefer to avoid having certain information collected, when it must be shared with others, as the overall VoI is negative for them. A similar result may occur for managers of infrastructure assets following the prescriptions of codes and regulations. Modern codes require the probability of some failure events be below a threshold, so managers are forced to retrofit assets if that probability is too high. If the economic incentive of those agents disagrees with the code requirements, the VoI associated with tests or inspections may be negative. In this paper, we investigate under what circumstance this happens, and how severe the effects of this issue can be.
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Information avoidance and overvaluation under epistemic constraints: Principles and implications for regulatory policies
The Value of Information (VoI) assesses the impact of data in a decision process. A risk-neutral agent, quantifying the VoI in monetary terms, prefers to collect data only if their VoI surpasses the cost to collect them. For an agent acting without external constraints, data have non-negative VoI (as free “information cannot hurt”) and those with an almost-negligible potential effect on the agent's belief have an almost-negligible VoI. However, these intuitive properties do not hold true for an agent acting under external constraints related to epistemic quantities, such as those posed by some regulations. For example, a manager forced to repair an asset when its probability of failure is too high can prefer to avoid collecting free information about the actual condition of the asset, and even to pay in order to avoid this, or she can assign a high VoI to almost-irrelevant data. Hence, by enforcing epistemic constraints in the regulations, the policy-maker can induce a range of counter-intuitive, but rational, behaviors, from information avoidance to over-evaluation of barely relevant information, in the agents obeying the regulations.
This paper illustrates how the structural properties of VoI change depending on such external epistemic constraints, and discusses how incentives and penalties can alleviate these induced attitudes toward information.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1638327
- PAR ID:
- 10161384
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Reliability engineering systems safety
- Volume:
- 197
- ISSN:
- 0951-8320
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 106814
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2020.106814
