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Information leaks are a significant problem in modern software systems. In recent years, information theoretic concepts, such as Shannon entropy, have been applied to quantifying information leaks in programs. One recent approach is to use symbolic execution together with model counting constraints solvers in order to quantify information leakage. There are at least two reasons for unsoundness in quantifying information leakage using this approach: 1) Symbolic execution may not be able to explore all execution paths, 2) Model counting constraints solvers may not be able to provide an exact count. We present a sound symbolic quantitative information flow analysis that bounds the information leakage both for the cases where the program behavior is not fully explored and the model counting constraint solver is unable to provide a precise model count but provides an upper and a lower bound. We implemented our approach as an extension to KLEE for computing sound bounds for information leakage in C programs.
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Subformula Caching for Model Counting and Quantitative Program Analysis
Quantitative program analysis is an emerging area with applications to software reliability, quantitative information flow, side-channel detection and attack synthesis. Most quantitative program analysis techniques rely on model counting constraint solvers, which are typically the bottleneck for scalability. Although the effectiveness of formula caching in expediting expensive model-counting queries has been demonstrated in prior work, our key insight is that many subformulas are shared across non-identical constraints generated during program analyses. This has not been utilized by prior formula caching approaches. In this paper we present a subformula caching framework and integrate it into a model counting constraint solver. We experimentally evaluate its effectiveness under three quantitative program analysis scenarios: 1) model counting constraints generated by symbolic execution, 2) reliability analysis using probabilistic symbolic execution, 3) adaptive attack synthesis for side-channels. Our experimental results demonstrate that our subformula caching approach significantly improves the performance of quantitative program analysis.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1817242
- PAR ID:
- 10167882
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 2019 34th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE)
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 453 to 464
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/ASE.2019.00050
