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Title: Adversarially Robust Learning Could Leverage Computational Hardness
Over recent years, devising classification algorithms that are robust to adversarial perturbations hasemerged as a challenging problem. In particular, deep neural nets (DNNs) seem to be susceptible tosmall imperceptible changes over test instances. However, the line of work inprovablerobustness,so far, has been focused oninformation theoreticrobustness, ruling out even theexistenceof anyadversarial examples. In this work, we study whether there is a hope to benefit fromalgorithmicnature of an attacker that searches for adversarial examples, and ask whether there isanylearning taskfor which it is possible to design classifiers that are only robust againstpolynomial-timeadversaries.Indeed, numerous cryptographic tasks (e.g. encryption of long messages) can only be secure againstcomputationally bounded adversaries, and are indeedimpossiblefor computationally unboundedattackers. Thus, it is natural to ask if the same strategy could help robust learning.We show that computational limitation of attackers can indeed be useful in robust learning bydemonstrating the possibility of a classifier for some learning task for which computational andinformation theoretic adversaries of bounded perturbations have very different power. Namely, whilecomputationally unbounded adversaries can attack successfully and find adversarial examples withsmall perturbation, polynomial time adversaries are unable to do so unless they can break standardcryptographic hardness assumptions. Our results, therefore, indicate that perhaps a similar approachto cryptography (relying on computational hardness) holds promise for achieving computationallyrobust machine learning. On the reverse directions, we also show that the existence of such learningtask in which computational robustness beats information theoretic robustness requires computationalhardness by implying (average-case) hardness o fNP.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1804648
NSF-PAR ID:
10174887
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
International Conference on Algorithmic Learning Theory
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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