Deception is a crucial tool in the cyberdefence repertoire, enabling defenders to leverage their informational advantage to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. One way deception can be employed is through obscuring, or masking, some of the information about how systems are configured, increasing attacker’s uncertainty about their tar-gets. We present a novel game-theoretic model of the resulting defender- attacker interaction, where the defender chooses a subset of attributes to mask, while the attacker responds by choosing an exploit to execute. The strategies of both players have combinatorial structure with complex informational dependencies, and therefore even representing these strategies is not trivial. First, we show that the problem of computing an equilibrium of the resulting zero-sum defender-attacker game can be represented as a linear program with a combinatorial number of system configuration variables and constraints, and develop a constraint generation approach for solving this problem. Next, we present a novel highly scalable approach for approximately solving such games by representing the strategies of both players as neural networks. The key idea is to represent the defender’s mixed strategy using a deep neural network generator, and then using alternating gradient-descent-ascent algorithm, analogous to the training of Generative Adversarial Networks. Our experiments, as well as a case study, demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach.
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It Takes Two to Lie: One to Lie, and One to Listen
Trust is implicit in many online text conversations—striking up new friendships, or asking for tech support. But trust can be betrayed through deception. We study the language and dynamics of deception in the negotiation-based game Diplomacy, where seven players compete for world domination by forging and breaking alliances with each other. Our study with players from the Diplomacy community gathers 17,289 messages annotated by the sender for their intended truthfulness and by the receiver for their perceived truthfulness. Unlike existing datasets, this captures deception in long-lasting relationships, where the interlocutors strategically combine truth with lies to advance objectives. A model that uses power dynamics and conversational contexts can predict when a lie occurs nearly as well as human players.
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- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10176522
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of ACL
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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