The recent framework for tiered spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band establishes rules in which multiple firms called Environment Sensing Capability operators (ESCs) may measure spectrum occupancy and sell these measurements to other firms to help facilitate spectrum access. Motived by this we consider a scenario in which two spectrum access firms (SAs) seeks to access a shared band of spectrum and must in turn purchase spectrum measurements from one of two ESCs. Given the measurements they purchase, the SA firms then compete on price to serve customers in a shared band of spectrum. We study how differences in the quality and price of the spectrum measurements impact the resulting market equilibrium between the SAs and find that having different qualities of measurements available to different SAs can lead to better economic welfare.
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Spot Markets for Spectrum Measurements
The recent framework for spectrum sharing in
the 3.5 GHz band allows for Environment Sensing Capability
operators (ESCs) to measure spectrum occupancy so as to enable
commercial use of this spectrum when federal incumbent users
are not present. Each ESC will contract with one or more
Spectrum Access Systems (SASs) to provide spectrum occupancy
data. Commercial firms using the band will in turn contract with
a SAS to determine when it can access the spectrum. Initially,
the decisions of which ESC and SAS to partner with will likely
be based on long-term contracts. In this paper, we consider
an alternative framework, in which an ESC sells its spectrum
management information via a spot market so that from periodto-
period a commercial user can select a different ESC from
which to acquire spectrum measurements. We develop a game
theoretic model to analyze such a market and show that using
such a spot market may better enable multiple commercial firms
to operate in a given spectrum band. We also show that this
increased competition may not benefit consumer surplus unless
firms adopt a non-stationary strategy profile.
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- PAR ID:
- 10178794
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE DySPAN
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1 to 10
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/DySPAN.2019.8935666
