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Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) are an increasingly growing segment of the market for wireless services. MVNOs do not own their own network infrastructure and so must cooperate with existing Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to gain access to the network infrastructure needed to enter this market. Cooperating with an MVNO is a non-trivial decision for an MNO in part because the MVNO may then become a potential competitor for customers. One motive for entering into such an arrangement is that the MVNO receives an added value from serving customers beyond what it earns from charging them for wireless service. We study a game theoretic model for the cooperation and competition between an MNO and such an added value MVNO based on models for price competition with congestible resources. Our model captures two different dimensions of how an MNO may cooperate. The first dimension is the payment scheme between the MNO and the MVNO. The second dimension is the access priority that the MNO chooses to offer to the MVNO's customers. We characterize the pros and cons of different cooperation modes and analyze the optimal cooperation mode under different conditions.
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Cross-Network Prioritized Sharing: An Added Value MVNO’s Perspective
We analyze the prioritized sharing between an added value Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) and multiple Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). An added value MVNO is one which earns added revenue from wireless users in addition to the revenue it directly collects for providing them wireless service. To offer service, an MVNO needs to contract with one or more MNOs to utilize their networks. Agreeing on such a contract requires the MNOs to consider the impact on their revenue from allowing the MVNO to enter the market as well as the possibility that other MNOs will cooperate. To further protect their customers, the MNOs may prioritize their direct customers over those of the MVNO. We establish a multi-stage game to analyze the equilibrium decisions of the MVNO, MNOs, and users in such a setting. In particular, we characterize the condition under which the MVNO can collaborate with the MNOs. The results show that the MVNO tends to cooperate with the MNOs when the band resources are limited and the added value is significant. When there is significant difference in band resources among the MNOs, the MVNO first considers cooperating with the MNO with a smaller band. We also consider the case when the users also have access to unlicensed spectrum.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1701921
- PAR ID:
- 10178784
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE INFOCOM
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1549 to 1557
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737636
