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It is common in online markets for agents to learn from other's actions. Such observational learning can lead to herding or information cascades in which agents eventually "follow the crowd". Models for such cascades have been well studied for Bayes-rational agents that choose pay-off optimal actions. In this paper, we additionally consider the presence of fake agents that seek to influence other agents into taking one particular action. To that end, these agents take a fixed action in order to influence the subsequent agents towards their preferred action. We characterize how the fraction of such fake agents impacts behavior of the remaining agents and show that in certain scenarios, an increase in the fraction of fake agents in fact reduces the chances of their preferred outcome. 

The recent framework for spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band allows for Environment Sensing Capability operators (ESCs) to measure spectrum occupancy so as to enable commercial use of this spectrum when federal incumbent users are not present. Each ESC will contract with one or more Spectrum Access Systems (SASs) to provide spectrum occupancy data. Commercial firms using the band will in turn contract with a SAS to determine when it can access the spectrum. Initially, the decisions of which ESC and SAS to partner with will likely be based on long-term contracts. In this paper, we consider an alternative framework, in which an ESC sells its spectrum management information via a spot market so that from periodto- period a commercial user can select a different ESC from which to acquire spectrum measurements. We develop a game theoretic model to analyze such a market and show that using such a spot market may better enable multiple commercial firms to operate in a given spectrum band. We also show that this increased competition may not benefit consumer surplus unless firms adopt a non-stationary strategy profile. 

Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) are an increasingly growing segment of the market for wireless services. MVNOs do not own their own network infrastructure and so must cooperate with existing Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to gain access to the network infrastructure needed to enter this market. Cooperating with an MVNO is a non-trivial decision for an MNO in part because the MVNO may then become a potential competitor for customers. One motive for entering into such an arrangement is that the MVNO receives an added value from serving customers beyond what it earns from charging them for wireless service. We study a game theoretic model for the cooperation and competition between an MNO and such an added value MVNO based on models for price competition with congestible resources. Our model captures two different dimensions of how an MNO may cooperate. The first dimension is the payment scheme between the MNO and the MVNO. The second dimension is the access priority that the MNO chooses to offer to the MVNO's customers. We characterize the pros and cons of different cooperation modes and analyze the optimal cooperation mode under different conditions. 

Adding new unlicensed wireless spectrum is a promising approach to accommodate increasing traffic demand. However, unlicensed spectrum may have a high risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an SP bundles its wireless service with a content service. We show that this can differentiate the SPs’ services and lead to positive SP profits. In particular, we study the characteristics of the content services that an SP should bundle with its wireless service, and analyze the impact of bundling on consumer surplus. 

We analyze the prioritized sharing between an added value Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) and multiple Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). An added value MVNO is one which earns added revenue from wireless users in addition to the revenue it directly collects for providing them wireless service. To offer service, an MVNO needs to contract with one or more MNOs to utilize their networks. Agreeing on such a contract requires the MNOs to consider the impact on their revenue from allowing the MVNO to enter the market as well as the possibility that other MNOs will cooperate. To further protect their customers, the MNOs may prioritize their direct customers over those of the MVNO. We establish a multi-stage game to analyze the equilibrium decisions of the MVNO, MNOs, and users in such a setting. In particular, we characterize the condition under which the MVNO can collaborate with the MNOs. The results show that the MVNO tends to cooperate with the MNOs when the band resources are limited and the added value is significant. When there is significant difference in band resources among the MNOs, the MVNO first considers cooperating with the MNO with a smaller band. We also consider the case when the users also have access to unlicensed spectrum. 

Conventionally, mobile network operators charge users for data plan subscriptions. To create new revenue streams, some operators now also incentivize users to watch ads with data rewards and collect payments from advertisers. In this work, we study two such rewarding schemes: a Subscription-Aware Rewarding (SAR) scheme and a Subscription-Unaware Rewarding (SUR) scheme. Under the SAR scheme, only the subscribers of the operators' existing data plans are eligible for the rewards; under the SUR scheme, all users are eligible for the rewards (e.g., the users who do not subscribe to the data plans can still get SIM cards and receive data rewards by watching ads). We model the interactions among a capacity-constrained operator, users, and advertisers by a two-stage Stackelberg game, and characterize their equilibrium strategies under both the SAR and SUR schemes. We show that the SAR scheme can lead to more subscriptions and a higher operator revenue from the data market, while the SUR scheme can lead to better ad viewership and a higher operator revenue from the ad market. We provide some counter-intuitive insights for the design of data rewards. For example, the operator's optimal choice between the two schemes is sensitive to the users' data consumption utility function. When each user has a logarithmic utility function, the operator should apply the SUR scheme (i.e., reward both subscribers and nonsubscribers) if and only if it has a small network capacity. 

LTE-U is an extension of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard for operation in unlicensed spectrum. LTE-U differs from WiFi, the predominant technology used in unlicensed spectrum in that it utilizes a duty cycle mode for accessing the spectrum and allows for a more seamless integration with LTE deployments in licensed spectrum. There have been a number of technical studies on the co-existence of LTE-U and WiFi in unlicensed spectrum In this paper, we instead investigate the impact of such a technology from an economic perspective. We consider a model in which an incumbent service provider (SP) deploys a duty cycle-based technology like LTE-U in an unlicensed band along with operating in a licensed band and competes with one or more entrants that only operate in the unlicensed band using a different technology like WiFi. We characterize the impact of a technology like LTE-U on the market outcome and show that the welfare impacts of this technology are subtle, depending in part on the amount of unlicensed spectrum and number of entrants. We also investigate the impact of the duty cycle and the portion of unlicensed spectrum used by the technology.