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We consider Byzantine consensus in a synchronous system where nodes are connected by a network modeled as a directed graph, i.e., communication links between neighboring nodes are not necessarily bi-directional. The directed graph model is motivated by wireless networks wherein asymmetric communication links can occur. In the classical point-to-point communication model, a message sent on a communication link is private between the two nodes on the link. This allows a Byzantine faulty node to equivocate, i.e., send inconsistent information to its neighbors. This paper considers the local broadcast model of communication, wherein transmission by a node is received identically by all of its outgoing neighbors, effectively depriving the faulty nodes of the ability to equivocate. Prior work has obtained sufficient and necessary conditions on undirected graphs to be able to achieve Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model. In this paper, we obtain tight conditions on directed graphs to be able to achieve Byzantine consensus with binary inputs under the local broadcast model. The results obtained in the paper provide insights into the trade-off between directionality of communication links and the ability to achieve consensus.
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Exact Byzantine Consensus on Undirected Graphs under Local Broadcast Model
This paper considers the Byzantine consensus problem for nodes with binary inputs. The nodes are interconnected by a network represented as an undirected graph, and the system is assumed to be synchronous. Under the classical point-to-point communication model, it is well-known that the following two conditions are both necessary and sufficient to achieve Byzantine consensus among n nodes in the presence of up to ƒ Byzantine faulty nodes: n & 3 #8805; 3 ≥ ƒ+ 1 and vertex connectivity at least 2 ƒ + 1. In the classical point-to-point communication model, it is possible for a faulty node to equivocate, i.e., transmit conflicting information to different neighbors. Such equivocation is possible because messages sent by a node to one of its neighbors are not overheard by other neighbors. This paper considers the local broadcast model. In contrast to the point-to-point communication model, in the local broadcast model, messages sent by a node are received identically by all of its neighbors. Thus, under the local broadcast model, attempts by a node to send conflicting information can be detected by its neighbors. Under this model, we show that the following two conditions are both necessary and sufficient for Byzantine consensus: vertex connectivity at least ⌋ 3 fƒ / 2 ⌊ + 1 and minimum node degree at least 2 ƒ. Observe that the local broadcast model results in a lower requirement for connectivity and the number of nodes n, as compared to the point-to-point communication model. We extend the above results to a hybrid model that allows some of the Byzantine faulty nodes to equivocate. The hybrid model bridges the gap between the point-to-point and local broadcast models, and helps to precisely characterize the trade-off between equivocation and network requirements.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1733872
- PAR ID:
- 10184837
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- ACM Symposium on Principles in Distributed Computing
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 327 to 336
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3293611.3331619
