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Title: A New Connection Between Node and Edge Depth Robust Graphs
Given a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G=(V,E), we say that G is (e,d)-depth-robust (resp. (e,d)-edge-depth-robust) if for any set S⊆V (resp. S⊆E) of at most |S|≤e nodes (resp. edges) the graph G−S contains a directed path of length d. While edge-depth-robust graphs are potentially easier to construct, many applications in cryptography require node depth-robust graphs with small indegree. We create a graph reduction that transforms an (e,d)-edge-depth-robust graph with m edges into a (e/2,d)-depth-robust graph with O(m) nodes and constant indegree. One immediate consequence of this result is the first construction of a provably (nloglognlogn,nlogn(logn)loglogn)-depth-robust graph with constant indegree. Our reduction crucially relies on ST-robust graphs, a new graph property we introduce which may be of independent interest. We say that a directed, acyclic graph with n inputs and n outputs is (k1,k2)-ST-robust if we can remove any k1 nodes and there exists a subgraph containing at least k2 inputs and k2 outputs such that each of the k2 inputs is connected to all of the k2 outputs. If the graph if (k1,n−k1)-ST-robust for all k1≤n we say that the graph is maximally ST-robust. We show how to construct maximally ST-robust graphs with constant indegree and O(n) nodes. Given a family M of ST-robust graphs and an arbitrary (e,d)-edge-depth-robust graph G we construct a new constant-indegree graph Reduce(G,M) by replacing each node in G with an ST-robust graph from M. We also show that ST-robust graphs can be used to construct (tight) proofs-of-space and (asymptotically) improved wide-block labeling functions.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1755708 1704587
NSF-PAR ID:
10200741
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
ITCS 2021
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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