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Title: A PUF Based CAN Security Framework
We propose a method to include security and reliability to the messages sent over the CAN bus. Our approach adheres to CAN standard ISO 11898-1. A reliable PUF response is used in key generation to create a unique shared AES-256 key between each ECU, allowing for all message paths to be encrypted. In addition, an HMAC system with a counter is implemented to help protect against replay attacks and message tampering within the network.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1738662
PAR ID:
10208143
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2020 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
602 to 603
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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