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In bipartite matching problems, vertices on one side of a bipartite graph are paired with those on the other. In its online variant, one side of the graph is available offline, while the vertices on the other side arrive online. When a vertex arrives, an irrevocable and immediate decision should be made by the algorithm; either match it to an available vertex or drop it. Examples of such problems include matching workers to firms, advertisers to keywords, organs to patients, and so on. Much of the literature focuses on maximizing the total relevance—modeled via total weight—of the matching. However, in many real-world problems, it is also important to consider contributions of diversity: hiring a diverse pool of candidates, displaying a relevant but diverse set of ads, and so on. In this paper, we propose the Online Submodular Bipartite Matching (OSBM) problem, where the goal is to maximize a submodular function f over the set of matched edges. This objective is general enough to capture the notion of both diversity (e.g., a weighted coverage function) and relevance (e.g., the traditional linear function)—as well as many other natural objective functions occurring in practice (e.g., limited total budget in advertising settings). We propose novel algorithms that have provable guarantees and are essentially optimal when restricted to various special cases. We also run experiments on real-world and synthetic datasets to validate our algorithms.
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Tractable Equilibria in Sponsored Search with Endogenous Budgets
We consider an ad network’s problem of allocating the auction for each individual impression to an optimal subset of advertisers with the goal of revenue maximization. This is a variant of bipartite matching except that advertisers may strategize by choosing their bidding profiles and their total budget. Because the ad network’s allocation rule affects the bidders’ strategies, equilibrium analysis is challenging. We show that this analysis is tractable when advertisers face a linear budget cost r_j. In particular, we show that the strategy in which advertisers bid their valuations shaded by a factor of 1 + r_j is an approximate equilibrium with the error decreasing with market size. This equilibrium can be interpreted as one in which a bidder facing an opportunity cost rj is guaranteed a return on investment of at least rj per dollar spent. Furthermore, in this equilibrium, the optimal allocation for the ad network, as determined from a linear program (LP), is greedy with high probability. This is in contrast with the exogenous budgets case, in which the LP optimization is challenging at practical scales. These results are evidence that, although in general such bipartite matching problems may be challenging to solve because of their high dimensionality, the optimal solution is remarkably simple at equilibrium.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2002156
- PAR ID:
- 10208188
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Operations Research
- ISSN:
- 0030-364X
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2052
