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Title: Cross-chain Transactions
The value of cryptocurrencies is highly volatile and investors require fast and reliable exchange systems. In cross-chain transactions, multiple parties exchange assets across multiple blockchains which can be represented as a directed graph with vertexes V as parties and edges E as asset transfers. In a simple form, cross-chain transactions are cross-chain swaps where each edge e transfers an asset that the head of e already owns. However, in general, a cross-chain transaction includes a sequence of exchanges at each blockchain. Further, transactions may have off-chain steps and hence may not be strongly connected. Given a transaction, protocols are desired that guarantee the following property called uniformity. If all parties conform to the protocol, all the assets should be transferred. Further, if any party deviates from the protocol, the conforming parties should not experience any loss. Previous work introduced a uniform protocol for strongly connected cross-chain swaps and showed that no uniform protocol exists for transactions that are not strongly connected. We present a uniform protocol for general cross-chain transactions with sequenced and off-chain steps when a few certain parties are conforming. Further, we prove a new property called end-to-end that guarantees that if the source parties pay, the sink parties are paid. We present a synthesis tool called XCHAIN that given a high-level description of a cross-transaction can automatically generate smart contracts in Solidity for all the parties.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1657204 1942711
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 9
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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