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Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have shown phenomenal success in a wide range of real-world applications. However, a concerning weakness of DNNs is that they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Although there exist methods to detect adversarial attacks, they often suffer constraints on specific attack types and provide limited information to downstream systems. We specifically note that existing adversarial detectors are often binary classifiers, which differentiate clean or adversarial examples. However, detection of adversarial examples is much more complicated than such a scenario. Our key insight is that the confidence probability of detecting an input sample as an adversarial example will be more useful for the system to properly take action to resist potential attacks. In this work, we propose an innovative method for fast confidence detection of adversarial attacks based on integrity of sensor pattern noise embedded in input examples. Experimental results show that our proposed method is capable of providing a confidence distribution model of most of popular adversarial attacks. Furthermore, our presented method can provide early attack warning with even the attack types based on different properties of the confidence distribution models. Since fast confidence detection is a computationally heavy task, we propose an FPGA-Based hardware architecture based on a series of optimization techniques, such as incremental multi-level quantization and etc. We realize our proposed method on an FPGA platform and achieve a high efficiency of 29.740 IPS/W with a power consumption of only 0.7626W.
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Generation of Low Distortion Adversarial Attacks via Convex Programming
As deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve extraordi- nary performance in a wide range of tasks, testing their robust- ness under adversarial attacks becomes paramount. Adversarial attacks, also known as adversarial examples, are used to measure the robustness of DNNs and are generated by incorporating imperceptible perturbations into the input data with the intention of altering a DNN’s classification. In prior work in this area, most of the proposed optimization based methods employ gradient descent to find adversarial examples. In this paper, we present an innovative method which generates adversarial examples via convex programming. Our experiment results demonstrate that we can generate adversarial examples with lower distortion and higher transferability than the C&W attack, which is the current state-of-the-art adversarial attack method for DNNs. We achieve 100% attack success rate on both the original undefended models and the adversarially-trained models. Our distortions of the L∞ attack are respectively 31% and 18% lower than the C&W attack for the best case and average case on the CIFAR-10 data set.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1750531
- PAR ID:
- 10287609
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE International Conference on Data Mining
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDM.2019.00195
