Web-based interactions enable agents to coordinate and generate collective action. Coordination can facilitate the spread of contagion to large groups within networked populations. In game theoretic contexts, coordination requires that agents share common knowledge about each other. Common knowledge emerges within a group when each member knows the states and the thresholds (preferences) of the other members, and critically, each member knows that everyone else has this information. Hence, these models of common knowledge and coordination on communication networks are fundamentally different from influence-based unilateral contagion models, such as those devised by Granovetter and Centola. Moreover, these models utilize differentmore »
Theoretical and Computational Characterizations of Interaction Mechanisms on Facebook Dynamics Using a Common Knowledge Model
Web-based interactions enable agents to coordinate and generate collective action. Coordination can facilitate the spread of contagion to large groups
within networked populations. In game theoretic contexts, coordination requires that agents share common
knowledge about each other. Common knowledge emerges
within a group when each member knows the states
and the thresholds (preferences) of the other members,
and critically, each member knows that everyone else
has this information. Hence, these models of common
knowledge and coordination on communication networks
are fundamentally different from influence-based unilateral contagion models, such as those devised by Granovetter and Centola. Moreover, these models utilize different mechanisms for driving contagion. We evaluate
three mechanisms of a common knowledge model that
can represent web-based communication among groups of people on Facebook, using nine social (media) networks. We provide theoretical results indicating the intractability in identifying all node-maximal bicliques in a network, which is the characterizing network structure that produces common knowledge. Bicliques are required for model execution. We also show that one
of the mechanisms (named PD2) dominates another mechanism (named ND2). Using simulations, we compute the spread of contagion on these networks in the Facebook model and demonstrate that different mechanisms can produce widely varying behaviors in terms of the extent of the spread and the speed more »
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10300631
- Journal Name:
- Social network analysis and mining
- ISSN:
- 1869-5450
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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