Although security games have attracted intensive research attention over the past years, few existing works consider how information from local communities would affect the game. In this paper, we introduce a new player  a strategic informant, who can observe and report upcoming attacks  to the defenderattacker security game setting. Characterized by a private type, the informant has his utility structure that leads to his strategic behaviors. We model the game as a 3player extensiveform game and propose a novel solution concept of Strong Stackelbergperfect Bayesian equilibrium. To compute the optimal defender strategy, we first show that although the informant can have infinitely many types in general, the optimal defense plan can only include a finite (exponential) number of different patrol strategies. We then prove that there exists a defense plan with only a linear number of patrol strategies that achieve the optimal defender's utility, which significantly reduces the computational burden and allows us to solve the game in polynomial time using linear programming. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments to show the effect of the strategic informant and demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm.
more » « less Award ID(s):
 1850477
 NSFPAR ID:
 10304097
 Date Published:
 Journal Name:
 Proceedings of the TwentyNinth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
 Format(s):
 Medium: X
 Sponsoring Org:
 National Science Foundation
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