An official website of the United States government
Despite remarkable improvements, automatic speech recognition is susceptible to adversarial perturbations. Compared to standard machine learning architectures, these attacks are significantly more challenging, especially since the inputs to a speech recognition system are time series that contain both acoustic and linguistic properties of speech. Extracting all recognition-relevant information requires more complex pipelines and an ensemble of specialized components. Consequently, an attacker needs to consider the entire pipeline. In this paper, we present VENOMAVE, the first training- time poisoning attack against speech recognition. Similar to the predominantly studied evasion attacks, we pursue the same goal: leading the system to an incorrect and attacker-chosen transcription of a target audio waveform. In contrast to evasion attacks, however, we assume that the attacker can only manipulate a small part of the training data without altering the target audio waveform at runtime. We evaluate our attack on two datasets: TIDIGITS and Speech Commands. When poisoning less than 0.17% of the dataset, VENOMAVE achieves attack success rates of more than 80.0%, without access to the victim’s network architecture or hyperparameters. In a more realistic scenario, when the target audio waveform is played over the air in different rooms, VENOMAVE maintains a success rate of up to 73.3%. Finally, VENOMAVE achieves an attack transferability rate of 36.4% between two different model architectures.
more »
« less
Real-time Neural Voice Camouflage
Automatic speech recognition systems have created exciting possibilities for ap- plications, however they also enable opportunities for systematic eavesdropping. We propose a method to camouflage a person’s voice over-the-air from these sys- tems without inconveniencing the conversation between people in the room. Stan- dard adversarial attacks are not effective in real-time streaming situations because the characteristics of the signal will have changed by the time the attack is exe- cuted. We introduce predictive attacks, which achieve real-time performance by forecasting the attack that will be the most effective in the future. Under real-time constraints, our method jams the established speech recognition system Deep- Speech 3.9x more than baselines as measured through word error rate, and 6.6x more as measured through character error rate. We furthermore demonstrate our approach is practically effective in realistic environments over physical distances.
more »
« less
- PAR ID:
- 10330392
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Conference on Learning Representations
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
More Like this
-
-
Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems convert speech into text and can be placed into two broad categories: traditional and fully end-to-end. Both types have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial audio examples that sound benign to the human ear but force the ASR to produce malicious transcriptions. Of these attacks, only the "psychoacoustic" attacks can create examples with relatively imperceptible perturbations, as they leverage the knowledge of the human auditory system. Unfortunately, existing psychoacoustic attacks can only be applied against traditional models, and are obsolete against the newer, fully end-to-end ASRs. In this paper, we propose an equalization-based psychoacoustic attack that can exploit both traditional and fully end-to-end ASRs. We successfully demonstrate our attack against real-world ASRs that include DeepSpeech and Wav2Letter. Moreover, we employ a user study to verify that our method creates low audible distortion. Specifically, 80 of the 100 participants voted in favor of all our attack audio samples as less noisier than the existing state-of-the-art attack. Through this, we demonstrate both types of existing ASR pipelines can be exploited with minimum degradation to attack audio quality.more » « less
-
Adversarial machine learning research has recently demonstrated the feasibility to confuse automatic speech recognition (ASR) models by introducing acoustically imperceptible perturbations to audio samples. To help researchers and practitioners gain better understanding of the impact of such attacks, and to provide them with tools to help them more easily evaluate and craft strong defenses for their models, we present Adagio, the first tool designed to allow interactive experimentation with adversarial attacks and defenses on an ASR model in real time, both visually and aurally. Adagio incorporates AMR and MP3 audio compression techniques as defenses, which users can interactively apply to attacked audio samples. We show that these techniques, which are based on psychoacoustic principles, effectively eliminate targeted attacks, reducing the attack success rate from 92.5% to 0%. We will demonstrate Adagio and invite the audience to try it on the Mozilla Common Voice dataset. Code related to this paper is available at: https://github.com/nilakshdas/ADAGIO.more » « less
-
Several attacks have been proposed against autonomous vehicles and their subsystems that are powered by machine learning (ML). Road sign recognition models are especially heavily tested under various adversarial ML attack settings, and they have proven to be vulnerable. Despite the increasing research on adversarial ML attacks against road sign recognition models, there is little to no focus on defending against these attacks. In this paper, we propose the first defense method specifically designed for autonomous vehicles to detect adversarial ML attacks targeting road sign recognition models, which is called ViLAS (Vision-Language Model for Adversarial Traffic Sign Detection). The proposed defense method is based on a custom, fast, lightweight, and salable vision-language model (VLM) and is compatible with any existing traffic sign recognition system. Thanks to the orthogonal information coming from the class label text data through the language model, ViLAS leverages image context in addition to visual data for highly effective attack detection performance. In our extensive experiments, we show that our method consistently detects various attacks against different target models with high true positive rates while satisfying very low false positive rates. When tested against four state-of-the-art attacks targeting four popular action recognition models, our proposed detector achieves an average AUC of 0.94. This result achieves a 25.3% improvement over a state-of-the-art defense method proposed for generic image attack detection, which attains an average AUC of 0.75. We also show that our custom VLM is more suitable for an autonomous vehicle compared to the popular off-the-shelf VLM and CLIP in terms of speed (4.4 vs. 9.3 milliseconds), space complexity (0.36 vs. 1.6 GB), and performance (0.94 vs. 0.43 average AUC).more » « less
-
An adversarial attack is an exploitative process in which minute alterations are made to natural inputs, causing the inputs to be misclassified by neural models. In the field of speech recognition, this has become an issue of increasing significance. Although adversarial attacks were originally introduced in computer vision, they have since infiltrated the realm of speech recognition. In 2017, a genetic attack was shown to be quite potent against the Speech Commands Model. Limited-vocabulary speech classifiers, such as the Speech Commands Model, are used in a variety of applications, particularly in telephony; as such, adversarial examples produced by this attack pose as a major security threat. This paper explores various methods of detecting these adversarial examples with combinations of audio preprocessing. One particular combined defense incorporating compressions, speech coding, filtering, and audio panning was shown to be quite effective against the attack on the Speech Commands Model, detecting audio adversarial examples with 93.5% precision and 91.2% recall.more » « less
- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- The DOI is not currently available.
