skip to main content

Title: A Game-Theoretic Approach for Probabilistic Cooperative Jamming Strategies over Parallel Wireless Channels
Considered is a network of parallel wireless channels in which individual parties are engaged in secret communication under the protection of cooperative jamming. A strategic eavesdropper selects the most vulnerable channels to attack. Existing works usually suggest the defender allocate limited cooperative jamming power to various channels. However, it usually requires some strong assumptions and complex computation to find such an optimal power control policy. This paper proposes a probabilistic cooperative jamming scheme such that the defender focuses on protecting randomly selected channels. Two different cases regarding each channel’s eavesdropping capacity are discussed. The first case studies the general scenario where each channel has different eavesdropping capacity. The second case analyzes an extreme scenario where all channels have the same eavesdropping capacity. Two non-zero-sum Nash games model the competition between the network defender and an eavesdropper in each case. Furthermore, considering the case that the defender does not know the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) leads to a Bayesian game. For all three games, we derive conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium (NE), and obtain the equilibria and the value functions in closed form.
; ;
Award ID(s):
Publication Date:
Journal Name:
2021 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)
Page Range or eLocation-ID:
47 to 55
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. Considered is a multi-channel wireless network for secret communication that uses the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the performance measure. An eavesdropper can intercept encoded messages through a degraded channel of each legitimate transmitter-receiver communication pair. A friendly interferer, on the other hand, may send cooperative jamming signals to enhance the secrecy performance of the whole network. Besides, the state information of the eavesdropping channel may not be known completely. The transmitters and the friendly interferer have to cooperatively decide on the optimal jamming power allocation strategy that balances the secrecy performance with the cost of employing intentional interference, while the eavesdropper tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. To solve this problem, we propose and analyze a non-zero-sum game between the network defender and the eavesdropper who can only attack a limited number of channels. We show that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the players are of threshold type. We present an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategy pair. Numerical examples demonstrate the equilibrium and contrast it to baseline strategies.
  2. We investigate the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of three new channel models: broadcast channel with combating helpers, interference channel with selfish users, and multiple access wiretap channel with deviating users. The goal of introducing these channel models is to investigate various malicious interactions that arise in networks, including active adversaries. That is in contrast with the common assumption in the literature that the users follow a certain protocol altruistically and transmit both message-carrying and cooperative jamming signals in an optimum manner. In the first model, over a classical broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCCM), there are two helpers, each associated with one of the receivers. In the second model, over a classical interference channel with confidential messages (ICCM), there is a helper and users are selfish. By casting each problem as an extensive-form game and applying recursive real interference alignment, we show that, for the first model, the combating intentions of the helpers are neutralized and the full s.d.o.f. is retained; for the second model, selfishness precludes secure communication and no s.d.o.f. is achieved. In the third model, we consider the multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WTC), where multiple legitimate users wish to have secure communication with a legitimate receivermore »in the presence of an eavesdropper. We consider the case when a subset of users deviate from the optimum protocol that attains the exact s.d.o.f. of this channel. We consider two kinds of deviation: when some of the users stop transmitting cooperative jamming signals, and when a user starts sending intentional jamming signals. For the first scenario, we investigate possible responses of the remaining users to counteract such deviation. For the second scenario, we use an extensive-form game formulation for the interactions of the deviating and well-behaving users. We prove that a deviating user can drive the s.d.o.f. to zero; however, the remaining users can exploit its intentional jamming signals as cooperative jamming signals against the eavesdropper and achieve an optimum s.d.o.f.« less
  3. Filipe J. ; Ghosh A. ; Prates R. O. ; Zhou L. (Ed.)
    This paper considers a parallel wireless network in which multiple individuals exchange confidential information through independent sender-receiver links. An eavesdropper can intercept encrypted information through a degraded channel of each sender-receiver link. A friendly jammer, by applying interference to the eavesdropping channels, can increase the level of secrecy of the network. The optimal power allocation strategy of the friendly jammer under a power constraint is derived. A convex optimization model is used when all channels are under the threat of an eavesdropping attack and a non-zero sum game model is analyzed when the eavesdropper can only attack a limited quantity of channels.
  4. Most of the cybersecurity research focus on either presenting a specific vulnerability %or hacking technique, or proposing a specific defense algorithm to defend against a well-defined attack scheme. Although such cybersecurity research is important, few have paid attention to the dynamic interactions between attackers and defenders, where both sides are intelligent and will dynamically change their attack or defense strategies in order to gain the upper hand over their opponents. This 'cyberwar' phenomenon exists among most cybersecurity incidents in the real world, which warrants special research and analysis. In this paper, we propose a dynamic game theoretic framework (i.e., hyper defense) to analyze the interactions between the attacker and the defender as a non-cooperative security game. The key idea is to model attackers/defenders to have multiple levels of attack/defense strategies that are different in terms of effectiveness, strategy costs, and attack gains/damages. Each player adjusts his strategy based on the strategy's cost, potential attack gain/damage, and effectiveness in anticipating of the opponent's strategy. We study the achievable Nash equilibrium for the attacker-defender security game where the players employ an efficient strategy according to the obtained equilibrium. Furthermore, we present case studies of three different types of network attacks and putmore »forth how our hyper defense system can successfully model them. Simulation results show that the proposed game theoretical system achieves a better performance compared to two other fixed-strategy defense systems.« less
  5. Abstract
    <p>Data files were used in support of the research paper titled &#34;“Experimentation Framework for Wireless<br /> Communication Systems under Jamming Scenarios&#34; which has been submitted to the IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory &amp; Applications journal. </p> <p>Authors: Marko Jacovic, Michael J. Liston, Vasil Pano, Geoffrey Mainland, Kapil R. Dandekar<br /> Contact: krd26&#64;</p> <p>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p> <p>Top-level directories correspond to the case studies discussed in the paper. Each includes the sub-directories: logs, parsers, rayTracingEmulation, results. </p> <p>--------------------------------</p> <p>logs:    - data logs collected from devices under test<br />     - &#39;defenseInfrastucture&#39; contains console output from a WARP 802.11 reference design network. Filename structure follows &#39;*x*dB_*y*.txt&#39; in which *x* is the reactive jamming power level and *y* is the jaming duration in samples (100k samples &#61; 1 ms). &#39;noJammer.txt&#39; does not include the jammer and is a base-line case. &#39;outMedian.txt&#39; contains the median statistics for log files collected prior to the inclusion of the calculation in the processing script. <br />     - &#39;uavCommunication&#39; contains MGEN logs at each receiver for cases using omni-directional and RALA antennas with a 10 dB constant jammer and without the jammer. Omni-directional folder contains multiple repeated experiments to provide reliable results during each calculation window. RALA directories use s*N* folders in whichMore>>