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1. 3-D printing of concrete: Beyond horizons

   https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cemconres.2020.106070  

   Khan MS, Sanchez F (July 2020, Cement and concrete research)

   3-D printing is a disruptive technology that can have enormous social and economic impacts in years to come. The technology, which took shape in the 1980's and was initially limited to manufacturing small products, is moving to large scale construction applications, utilizing concrete and other cementitious and binder materials. This paper presents a state-of-the-art and state-of-the-practice of 3-D printing of concrete including a historical background and advances in equipment, materials, and computer modeling. Some demonstration projects are presented and opportunities and challenges associated with 3-D printing of concrete are identified. Formulation of ink utilizing local and in-situ materials is a major challenge and will continue to develop. Developments will also continue on large scale construction 3-D printers. The paper should be of value to both the seasoned researchers and beginners in 3-D printing, and also to those working on transitioning 3-D printing in construction from research to practice. 

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2. TAAL: Tampering Attack on Any Key-based Logic Locked Circuits

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3442379  

   Jain, Ayush; Zhou, Ziqi; Guin, Ujjwal (March 2021, ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems)

   null (Ed.)

   Due to the globalization of semiconductor manufacturing and test processes, the system-on-a-chip (SoC) designers no longer design the complete SoC and manufacture chips on their own. This outsourcing of the design and manufacturing of Integrated Circuits (ICs) has resulted in several threats, such as overproduction of ICs, sale of out-of-specification/rejected ICs, and piracy of Intellectual Properties (IPs). Logic locking has emerged as a promising defense strategy against these threats. However, various attacks about the extraction of secret keys have undermined the security of logic locking techniques. Over the years, researchers have proposed different techniques to prevent existing attacks. In this article, we propose a novel attack that can break any logic locking techniques that rely on the stored secret key. This proposed TAAL attack is based on implanting a hardware Trojan in the netlist, which leaks the secret key to an adversary once activated. As an untrusted foundry can extract the netlist of a design from the layout/mask information, it is feasible to implement such a hardware Trojan. All three proposed types of TAAL attacks can be used for extracting secret keys. We have introduced the models for both the combinational and sequential hardware Trojans that evade manufacturing tests. An adversary only needs to choose one hardware Trojan out of a large set of all possible Trojans to launch the TAAL attack. 

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3. A Novel Tampering Attack on AES Cores with Hardware Trojans

   https://doi.org/10.1109/ITC-Asia51099.2020.00025  

   Jain, Ayush; Guin, Ujjwal (September 2020, 2020 IEEE International Test Conference in Asia (ITC-Asia))

   null (Ed.)

   The implementation of cryptographic primitives in integrated circuits (ICs) continues to increase over the years due to the recent advancement of semiconductor manufacturing and reduction of cost per transistors. The hardware implementation makes cryptographic operations faster and more energy-efficient. However, various hardware attacks have been proposed aiming to extract the secret key in order to undermine the security of these primitives. In this paper, we focus on the widely used advanced encryption standard (AES) block cipher and demonstrate its vulnerability against tampering attack. Our proposed attack relies on implanting a hardware Trojan in the netlist by an untrusted foundry, which can design and implement such a Trojan as it has access to the design layout and mask information. The hardware Trojan's activation modifies a particular round's input data by preventing the effect of all previous rounds' key-dependent computation. We propose to use a sequential hardware Trojan to deliver the payload at the input of an internal round for achieving this modification of data. All the internal subkeys, and finally, the secret key can be computed from the observed ciphertext once the Trojan is activated. We implement our proposed tampering attack with a sequential hardware Trojan inserted into a 128-bit AES design from OpenCores benchmark suite and report the area overhead to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed tampering attack. 

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4. Using 3D Printing to Teach Design and Manufacturing Concepts

   Aqlan, Faisal; de Vries, Charlotte; Sargent, Mariea; Valentine, Andrew (January 2020, Proceedings of the 2020 IISE Annual Conference)

   null (Ed.)

   Additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, is commonly shown to students through low cost 3D printers. Many high school and community college educators have access to 3D printers at their home institutions. In this study, Research Experience for Teachers (RET) participants developed a set of modules which can be integrated with a design project given at both the high school and college curriculum levels to explore the concepts of manufacturing and design (e.g., dimensioning and tolerancing, Design for X, Proof of Concept, etc.). The study identified a product in which these concepts can be integrated, and developed a set of constraints the students need to consider in their design project. It was the goal of the RET participants to identify best practices for teaching 3D printing and develop projects to explain design and manufacturing concepts through 3D printing. 

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5. Design of AI Trojans for Evading Machine Learning-based Detection of Hardware Trojans

   https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE54114.2022.9774654  

   Pan, Zhixin; Mishra, Prabhat (March 2022, Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE))

   The globalized semiconductor supply chain significantly increases the risk of exposing System-on-Chip (SoC) designs to malicious implants, popularly known as hardware Trojans. Traditional simulation-based validation is unsuitable for detection of carefully-crafted hardware Trojans with extremely rare trigger conditions. While machine learning (ML) based Trojan detection approaches are promising due to their scalability as well as detection accuracy, ML-based methods themselves are vulnerable from Trojan attacks. In this paper, we propose a robust backdoor attack on ML-based Trojan detection algorithms to demonstrate this serious vulnerability. The proposed framework is able to design an AI Trojan and implant it inside the ML model that can be triggered by specific inputs. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed AI Trojans can bypass state-of-the-art defense algorithms. Moreover, our approach provides a fast and cost-effective solution in achieving 100% attack success rate that significantly outperforms state-of-the art approaches based on adversarial attacks. 

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