skip to main content

Title: Designing a Digital Twin for Quantum Key Distribution
Classical optical devices lack precision when they operate on single photons. We report a Quantum Digital Twin (QDT) to improve Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) implementations. We show a QDT increasing the Key Exchange Rate under environmental events.
Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Award ID(s):
1836921
Publication Date:
NSF-PAR ID:
10359449
Journal Name:
European Conference on Optical Communication
ISSN:
2688-254X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. Quantum key distribution, which allows two distant parties to share an unconditionally secure cryptographic key, promises to play an important role in the future of communication. For this reason such technique has attracted many theoretical and experimental efforts, thus becoming one of the most prominent quantum technologies of the last decades. The security of the key relies on quantum mechanics and therefore requires the users to be capable of performing quantum operations, such as state preparation or measurements in multiple bases. A natural question is whether and to what extent these requirements can be relaxed and the quantum capabilities of the users reduced. Here we demonstrate a novel quantum key distribution scheme, where users are fully classical. In our protocol, the quantum operations are performed by an untrusted third party acting as a server, which gives the users access to a superimposed single photon, and the key exchange is achieved via interaction-free measurements on the shared state. We also provide a full security proof of the protocol by computing the secret key rate in the realistic scenario of finite-resources, as well as practical experimental conditions of imperfect photon source and detectors. Our approach deepens the understanding of the fundamental principlesmore »underlying quantum key distribution and, at the same time, opens up new interesting possibilities for quantum cryptography networks« less
  2. Motivated by the rise of quantum computers, existing public-key cryptosystems are expected to be replaced by post-quantum schemes in the next decade in billions of devices. To facilitate the transition, NIST is running a standardization process which is currently in its final Round. Only three digital signature schemes are left in the competition, among which Dilithium and Falcon are the ones based on lattices. Besides security and performance, significant attention has been given to resistance against implementation attacks that target side-channel leakage or fault injection response. Classical fault attacks on signature schemes make use of pairs of faulty and correct signatures to recover the secret key which only works on deterministic schemes. To counter such attacks, Dilithium offers a randomized version which makes each signature unique, even when signing identical messages. In this work, we introduce a novel Signature Correction Attack which not only applies to the deterministic version but also to the randomized version of Dilithium and is effective even on constant-time implementations using AVX2 instructions. The Signature Correction Attack exploits the mathematical structure of Dilithium to recover the secret key bits by using faulty signatures and the public-key. It can work for any fault mechanism which can inducemore »single bit-flips. For demonstration, we are using Rowhammer induced faults. Thus, our attack does not require any physical access or special privileges, and hence could be also implemented on shared cloud servers. Using Rowhammer attack, we inject bit flips into the secret key s1 of Dilithium, which results in incorrect signatures being generated by the signing algorithm. Since we can find the correct signature using our Signature Correction algorithm, we can use the difference between the correct and incorrect signatures to infer the location and value of the flipped bit without needing a correct and faulty pair. To quantify the reduction in the security level, we perform a thorough classical and quantum security analysis of Dilithium and successfully recover 1,851 bits out of 3,072 bits of secret key $s_{1}$ for security level 2. Fully recovered bits are used to reduce the dimension of the lattice whereas partially recovered coefficients are used to to reduce the norm of the secret key coefficients. Further analysis for both primal and dual attacks shows that the lattice strength against quantum attackers is reduced from 2128 to 281 while the strength against classical attackers is reduced from 2141 to 289. Hence, the Signature Correction Attack may be employed to achieve a practical attack on Dilithium (security level 2) as proposed in Round 3 of the NIST post-quantum standardization process.« less
  3. Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF- and PRP-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives. We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key uses a linear number of decryption queries, and this is optimal. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should *not* be interpreted as a weakness ofmore »these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones.« less
  4. Quantum computing challenges the computational hardness assumptions anchoring the security of public-key ciphers, such as the prime factorization and the discrete logarithm problem. To prepare for the quantum era and withstand the attacks equipped with quantum computing, the security and cryptography communities are designing new quantum-resistant public-key ciphers. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is collecting and standardizing the post-quantum ciphers, similarly to its past involvements in establishing DES and AES as symmetric cipher standards. The NIST finalist algorithms for public-key signatures are Dilithium, Falcon, and Rainbow. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design, the underlying computational hardness assumptions (lattice based vs. multivariate based), and the different metrics used for security strength analyses in the previous research (qubits vs. quantum gates). We overcome such challenges and compare the security and the performances of the finalist post-quantum ciphers of Dilithium, Falcon, and Rainbow. For security comparison analyses, we advance the prior literature by using the depth-width cost for quantum circuits (DW cost) to measure the security strengths and by analyzing the security in Universal Quantum Gate Model and with Quantum Annealing. For performance analyses, we compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the executionmore »time as well as the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our work presents a security comparison and performance analysis as well as the trade-off analysis to inform the post-quantum cipher design and standardization to protect computing and networking in the post-quantum era.« less
  5. Post-quantum schemes are expected to replace existing public-key schemes within a decade in billions of devices. To facilitate the transition, the US National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) is running a standardization process. Multivariate signatures is one of the main categories in NIST's post-quantum cryptography competition. Among the four candidates in this category, the LUOV and Rainbow schemes are based on the Oil and Vinegar scheme, first introduced in 1997 which has withstood over two decades of cryptanalysis. Beyond mathematical security and efficiency, security against side-channel attacks is a major concern in the competition. The current sentiment is that post-quantum schemes may be more resistant to fault-injection attacks due to their large key sizes and the lack of algebraic structure. We show that this is not true. We introduce a novel hybrid attack, QuantumHammer, and demonstrate it on the constant-time implementation of LUOV currently in Round 2 of the NIST post-quantum competition. The QuantumHammer attack is a combination of two attacks, a bit-tracing attack enabled via Rowhammer fault injection and a divide and conquer attack that uses bit-tracing as an oracle. Using bit-tracing, an attacker with access to faulty signatures collected using Rowhammer attack, can recover secret key bitsmore »albeit slowly. We employ a divide and conquer attack which exploits the structure in the key generation part of LUOV and solves the system of equations for the secret key more efficiently with few key bits recovered via bit-tracing. We have demonstrated the first successful in-the-wild attack on LUOV recovering all 11K key bits with less than 4 hours of an active Rowhammer attack. The post-processing part is highly parallel and thus can be trivially sped up using modest resources. QuantumHammer does not make any unrealistic assumptions, only requires software co-location (no physical access), and therefore can be used to target shared cloud servers or in other sandboxed environments.« less