For high-level Autonomous Vehicles (AV), localization is highly security and safety critical. One direct threat to it is GPS spoofing, but fortunately, AV systems today predominantly use Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) algorithms that are generally believed to have the potential to practically defeat GPS spoofing. However, no prior work has studied whether today’s MSF algorithms are indeed sufficiently secure under GPS spoofing, especially in AV settings. In this work, we perform the first study to fill this critical gap. As the first study, we focus on a production-grade MSF with both design and implementation level representativeness, and identify two AV-specific attack goals, off-road and wrong-way attacks. To systematically understand the security property, we first analyze the upper-bound attack effectiveness, and discover a take-over effect that can fundamentally defeat the MSF design principle. We perform a cause analysis and find that such vulnerability only appears dynamically and non-deterministically. Leveraging this insight, we design FusionRipper, a novel and general attack that opportunistically captures and exploits take-over vulnerabilities. We evaluate it on 6 real-world sensor traces, and find that FusionRipper can achieve at least 97% and 91.3% success rates in all traces for off-road and wrongway attacks respectively. We also find that it ismore »
Too Afraid to Drive: Systematic Discovery of Semantic DoS Vulnerability in Autonomous Driving Planning under Physical-World Attacks
In high-level Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, behavioral planning is in charge of making high-level driving decisions such as cruising and stopping, and thus highly securitycritical. In this work, we perform the first systematic study of semantic security vulnerabilities specific to overly-conservative AD behavioral planning behaviors, i.e., those that can cause failed or significantly-degraded mission performance, which can be critical for AD services such as robo-taxi/delivery. We call them semantic Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerabilities, which we envision to be most generally exposed in practical AD systems due to the tendency for conservativeness to avoid safety incidents. To achieve high practicality and realism, we assume that the attacker can only introduce seemingly-benign external physical objects to the driving environment, e.g., off-road dumped cardboard boxes. To systematically discover such vulnerabilities, we design PlanFuzz, a novel dynamic testing approach that addresses various problem-specific design challenges. Specifically, we propose and identify planning invariants as novel testing oracles, and design new input generation to systematically enforce problemspecific constraints for attacker-introduced physical objects. We also design a novel behavioral planning vulnerability distance metric to effectively guide the discovery. We evaluate PlanFuzz on 3 planning implementations from practical open-source AD systems, and find that it can effectively discover 9 more »
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10359471
- Journal Name:
- ISOC Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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In Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, perception is both security and safety critical. Despite various prior studies on its security issues, all of them only consider attacks on cameraor LiDAR-based AD perception alone. However, production AD systems today predominantly adopt a Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) based design, which in principle can be more robust against these attacks under the assumption that not all fusion sources are (or can be) attacked at the same time. In this paper, we present the first study of security issues of MSF-based perception in AD systems. We directly challenge the basic MSF design assumption above by exploring the possibility of attacking all fusion sources simultaneously. This allows us for the first time to understand how much security guarantee MSF can fundamentally provide as a general defense strategy for AD perception. We formulate the attack as an optimization problem to generate a physically-realizable, adversarial 3D-printed object that misleads an AD system to fail in detecting it and thus crash into it. To systematically generate such a physical-world attack, we propose a novel attack pipeline that addresses two main design challenges: (1) non-differentiable target camera and LiDAR sensing systems, and (2) non-differentiable cell-level aggregated features popularly used in LiDAR-basedmore »
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