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Title: Metrics for Assessing Security of System-on-Chip
Due to the increasing complexity of modern hetero-geneous System-on-Chips (SoC) and the growing vulnerabilities, security risk assessment and quantification is required to measure the trustworthiness of a SoC. This paper describes a systematic approach to model the security risk of a system for malicious hardware attacks. The proposed method uses graph analysis to assess the impact of an attack and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is used to quantify the security level of the system. To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed metric, we consider two open source SoC benchmarks with different architectures. The overall risk is calculated using the proposed metric by computing the exploitability and impact of attack on critical components of a SoC.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2007320
NSF-PAR ID:
10366094
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
113 to 116
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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