Advantages and disadvantages exist for presenting numeric information in science communication. On the one hand, public innumeracy and experts’ concerns about providing numbers suggest not always showing them. On the other hand, people often prefer getting them, and their provision can increase comprehension, trust, and healthy behaviors while reducing risk overestimates and supporting decision-making autonomy. Presenting numeric facts without considering their comprehensibility and usability, however, is like throwing good money after bad. We summarize research concerning three theory-based strategies that improve the understanding and use of numbers by decreasing cognitive effort (e.g., doing the math for the audience), being consistent with principles of numeric cognition, and providing affective meaning.
- Award ID(s):
- 2103495
- PAR ID:
- 10388085
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- ISSN:
- 1745-6916
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 174569162210832
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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