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1. Algorithmic Decision-Making under Agents with Persistent Improvement

   Xie, Tian; Tan, Xuwei; Zhang, Xueru (August 2024, 7th AAAI Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society)

   This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort strategically and improve to receive favorable decisions. Unlike prior works that assume agents benefit from their efforts immediately, we consider realistic scenarios where the impacts of these efforts are persistent and agents benefit from efforts by making improvements gradually. We first develop a dynamic model to characterize persistent improvements and based on this construct a Stackelberg game to model the interplay between agents and the decision-maker. We analytically characterize the equilibrium strategies and identify conditions under which agents have incentives to improve. With the dynamics, we then study how the decision-maker can design an optimal policy to incentivize the largest improvements inside the agent population. We also extend the model to settings where 1) agents may be dishonest and game the algorithm into making favorable but erroneous decisions; 2) honest efforts are forgettable and not sufficient to guarantee persistent improvements. With the extended models, we further examine conditions under which agents prefer honest efforts over dishonest behavior and the impacts of forgettable efforts. 

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2. Lookahead Counterfactual Fairness

   Zuo, Zhiqun; Xie, Tian; Tan, Xuwei; Zhang, Xueru; Khalili, Mohammad Mahdi (December 2024, Transactions on Machine Learning Research)

   As machine learning (ML) algorithms are used in applications that involve humans, concerns have arisen that these algorithms may be biased against certain social groups. Counterfactual fairness (CF) is a fairness notion proposed in Kusner et al. (2017) that measures the unfairness of ML predictions; it requires that the prediction perceived by an individual in the real world has the same marginal distribution as it would be in a counterfactual world, in which the individual belongs to a different group. Although CF ensures fair ML predictions, it fails to consider the downstream effects of ML predictions on individuals. Since humans are strategic and often adapt their behaviors in response to the ML system, predictions that satisfy CF may not lead to a fair future outcome for the individuals. In this paper, we introduce lookahead counterfactual fairness (LCF), a fairness notion accounting for the downstream effects of ML models which requires the individual future status to be counterfactually fair. We theoretically identify conditions under which LCF can be satisfied and propose an algorithm based on the theorems. We also extend the concept to path-dependent fairness. Experiments on both synthetic and real data validate the proposed method 

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3. Learning From Strategic Agents: Accuracy, Improvement, and Causality, ICML

   Shavit, Yonadav; Edelman, Benjamin; Axelrod, Brian (July 2020, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research)

   In many predictive decision-making scenarios, such as credit scoring and academic testing, a decision-maker must construct a model that accounts for agents' incentives to ``game'' their features in order to receive better decisions. Whereas the strategic classification literature generally assumes that agents' outcomes are not causally dependent on their features (and thus strategic behavior is a form of lying), we join concurrent work in modeling agents' outcomes as a function of their changeable attributes. Our formulation is the first to incorporate a crucial phenomenon: when agents act to change observable features, they may as a side effect perturb unobserved features that causally affect their true outcomes. We consider three distinct desiderata for a decision-maker's model: accurately predicting agents' post-gaming outcomes (accuracy), incentivizing agents to improve these outcomes (improvement), and, in the linear setting, estimating the visible coefficients of the true causal model (causal precision). As our main contribution, we provide the first algorithms for learning accuracy-optimizing, improvement-optimizing, and causal-precision-optimizing linear regression models directly from data, without prior knowledge of agents' possible actions. These algorithms circumvent the hardness result of Miller et al. (2019) by allowing the decision maker to observe agents' responses to a sequence of decision rules, in effect inducing agents to perform causal interventions for free. 

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4. Non-linear Welfare-Aware Strategic Learning

   Xie, Tian; Zhang, Xueru (August 2024, 7th AAAI Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society)

   This paper studies algorithmic decision-making in the presence of strategic individual behaviors, where an ML model is used to make decisions about human agents and the latter can adapt their behavior strategically to improve their future data. Existing results on strategic learning have largely focused on the linear setting where agents with linear labeling functions best respond to a (noisy) linear decision policy. Instead, this work focuses on general non-linear settings where agents respond to the decision policy with only "local information" of the policy. Moreover, we simultaneously consider the objectives of maximizing decision-maker welfare (model prediction accuracy), social welfare (agent improvement caused by strategic behaviors), and agent welfare (the extent that ML underestimates the agents). We first generalize the agent best response model in previous works to the non-linear setting, then reveal the compatibility of welfare objectives. We show the three welfare can attain the optimum simultaneously only under restrictive conditions which are challenging to achieve in non-linear settings. The theoretical results imply that existing works solely maximizing the welfare of a subset of parties inevitably diminish the welfare of the others. We thus claim the necessity of balancing the welfare of each party in non-linear settings and propose an irreducible optimization algorithm suitable for general strategic learning. Experiments on synthetic and real data validate the proposed algorithm. 

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5. Fairness and accuracy under domain generalization

   Thai-Hoang Pham; Xueru Zhang; Ping Zhang (February 2023, International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR))

   As machine learning (ML) algorithms are increasingly used in high-stakes applications, concerns have arisen that they may be biased against certain social groups. Although many approaches have been proposed to make ML models fair, they typically rely on the assumption that data distributions in training and deployment are identical. Unfortunately, this is commonly violated in practice and a model that is fair during training may lead to an unexpected outcome during its deployment. Although the problem of designing robust ML models under dataset shifts has been widely studied, most existing works focus only on the transfer of accuracy. In this paper, we study the transfer of both fairness and accuracy under domain generalization where the data at test time may be sampled from never-before-seen domains. We first develop theoretical bounds on the unfairness and expected loss at deployment, and then derive sufficient conditions under which fairness and accuracy can be perfectly transferred via invariant representation learning. Guided by this, we design a learning algorithm such that fair ML models learned with training data still have high fairness and accuracy when deployment environments change. Experiments on real-world data validate the proposed algorithm. 

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