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Title: Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks
This article studies a problem of strategic network inspection, in which a defender (agency) is tasked with detecting the presence of multiple attacks in the network. An inspection strategy entails monitoring the network components, possibly in a randomized manner, using a given number of detectors. We formulate the network inspection problem [Formula: see text] as a large-scale bilevel optimization problem, in which the defender seeks to determine an inspection strategy with minimum number of detectors that ensures a target expected detection rate under worst-case attacks. We show that optimal solutions of [Formula: see text] can be obtained from the equilibria of a large-scale zero-sum game. Our equilibrium analysis involves both game-theoretic and combinatorial arguments and leads to a computationally tractable approach to solve [Formula: see text]. First, we construct an approximate solution by using solutions of minimum set cover (MSC) and maximum set packing (MSP) problems and evaluate its detection performance. In fact, this construction generalizes some of the known results in network security games. Second, we leverage properties of the optimal detection rate to iteratively refine our MSC/MSP-based solution through a column generation procedure. Computational results on benchmark water networks demonstrate the scalability, performance, and operational feasibility of our approach. The results indicate that utilities can achieve a high level of protection in large-scale networks by strategically positioning a small number of detectors.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1453126
PAR ID:
10394855
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Operations Research
Volume:
70
Issue:
2
ISSN:
0030-364X
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1008 to 1024
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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