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1. Securing Real-Time Internet-of-Things

   https://doi.org/10.3390/s18124356  

   Chen, Chien-Ying ; Hasan, Monowar ; Mohan, Sibin ( December 2018 , Sensors)

   Modern embedded and cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous. Many critical cyber-physical systems have real-time requirements (e.g., avionics, automobiles, power grids, manufacturing systems, industrial control systems, etc.). Recent developments and new functionality require real-time embedded devices to be connected to the Internet. This gives rise to the real-time Internet-of-things (RT-IoT) that promises a better user experience through stronger connectivity and efficient use of next-generation embedded devices. However, RT-IoT are also increasingly becoming targets for cyber-attacks, which is exacerbated by this increased connectivity. This paper gives an introduction to RT-IoT systems, an outlook of current approaches and possible research challenges towards secure RT-IoT frameworks. 

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2. PAtt: Physics-based Attestation of Control Systems

   Ghaeini, H.R. ; Chan, M. ; Bahmani, R. ; F., Garcia ; Zhou, J. ; Sadeghi, A.R. ; Tippenhauer, N.O. ; Zonouz, S ( September 2019 , 22nd International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2019))

   null (Ed.)

   Ensuring the integrity of embedded programmable logic controllers (PLCs) is critical for safe operation of industrial control systems. In particular, a cyber-attack could manipulate control logic running on the PLCs to bring the process of safety-critical application into unsafe states. Unfortunately, PLCs are typically not equipped with hardware support that allows the use of techniques such as remote attestation to verify the integrity of the logic code. In addition, so far remote attestation is not able to verify the integrity of the physical process controlled by the PLC. In this work, we present PAtt, a system that combines remote software attestation with control process validation. PAtt leverages operation permutations—subtle changes in the operation sequences based on integrity measurements—which do not affect the physical process but yield unique traces of sensor readings during execution. By encoding integrity measurements of the PLC’s memory state (software and data) into its control operation, our system allows to remotely verify the integrity of the control logic based on the resulting sensor traces. We implement the proposed system on a real PLC controlling a robot arm, and demonstrate its feasibility. Our implementation enables the detection of attackers that manipulate the PLC logic to change process state and/or report spoofed sensor readings (with an accuracy of 97% against tested attacks). 

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3. Integrated instruction set randomization and control reconfiguration for securing cyber-physical systems

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3190619.3190636  

   Potteiger, Bradley ; Zhang, Zhenkai ; Koutsoukos, Xenofon ( April 2018 , HoTSoS '18 Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium and Bootcamp on Hot Topics in the Science of Security)

   Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have been increasingly subject to cyber-attacks including code injection attacks. Zero day attacks further exasperate the threat landscape by requiring a shift to defense in depth approaches. With the tightly coupled nature of cyber components with the physical domain, these attacks have the potential to cause significant damage if safety-critical applications such as automobiles are compromised. Moving target defense techniques such as instruction set randomization (ISR) have been commonly proposed to address these types of attacks. However, under current implementations an attack can result in system crashing which is unacceptable in CPS. As such, CPS necessitate proper control reconfiguration mechanisms to prevent a loss of availability in system operation. This paper addresses the problem of maintaining system and security properties of a CPS under attack by integrating ISR, detection, and recovery capabilities that ensure safe, reliable, and predictable system operation. Specifically, we consider the problem of detecting code injection attacks and reconfiguring the controller in real-time. The developed framework is demonstrated with an autonomous vehicle case study. 

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4. Eagle: End-to-end Deep Reinforcement Learning based Autonomous Control of PTZ Cameras

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3576842.3582366  

   Sandha, Sandeep Singh ; Balaji, Bharathan ; Garcia, Luis ; Srivastava, Mani ( May 2023 , IoTDI '23: Proceedings of the 8th ACM/IEEE Conference on Internet of Things Design and Implementation)

   Existing approaches for autonomous control of pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras use multiple stages where object detection and localization are performed separately from the control of the PTZ mechanisms. These approaches require manual labels and suffer from performance bottlenecks due to error propagation across the multi-stage flow of information. The large size of object detection neural networks also makes prior solutions infeasible for real-time deployment in resource-constrained devices. We present an end-to-end deep reinforcement learning (RL) solution called Eagle1 to train a neural network policy that directly takes images as input to control the PTZ camera. Training reinforcement learning is cumbersome in the real world due to labeling effort, runtime environment stochasticity, and fragile experimental setups. We introduce a photo-realistic simulation framework for training and evaluation of PTZ camera control policies. Eagle achieves superior camera control performance by maintaining the object of interest close to the center of captured images at high resolution and has up to 17% more tracking duration than the state-of-the-art. Eagle policies are lightweight (90x fewer parameters than Yolo5s) and can run on embedded camera platforms such as Raspberry PI (33 FPS) and Jetson Nano (38 FPS), facilitating real-time PTZ tracking for resource-constrained environments. With domain randomization, Eagle policies trained in our simulator can be transferred directly to real-world scenarios2. 

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5. Integrating Security in Resource-Constrained Cyber-Physical Systems

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3380866  

   Lesi, Vuk ; Jovanov, Ilija ; Pajic, Miroslav ( May 2020 , ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems)

   null (Ed.)

   Defense mechanisms against network-level attacks are commonly based on the use of cryptographic techniques, such as lengthy message authentication codes (MAC) that provide data integrity guarantees. However, such mechanisms require significant resources (both computational and network bandwidth), which prevents their continuous use in resource-constrained cyber-physical systems (CPS). Recently, it was shown how physical properties of controlled systems can be exploited to relax these stringent requirements for systems where sensor measurements and actuator commands are transmitted over a potentially compromised network; specifically, that merely intermittent use of data authentication (i.e., at occasional time points during system execution), can still provide strong Quality-of-Control (QoC) guarantees even in the presence of false-data injection attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. Consequently, in this work, we focus on integrating security into existing resource-constrained CPS, in order to protect against MitM attacks on a system where a set of control tasks communicates over a real-time network with system sensors and actuators. We introduce a design-time methodology that incorporates requirements for QoC in the presence of attacks into end-to-end timing constraints for real-time control transactions, which include data acquisition and authentication, real-time network messages, and control tasks. This allows us to formulate a mixed integer linear programming-based method for direct synthesis of schedulable tasks and message parameters (i.e., deadlines and offsets) that do not violate timing requirements for the already deployed controllers, while adding a sufficient level of protection against network-based attacks; specifically, the synthesis method also provides suitable intermittent authentication policies that ensure the desired QoC levels under attack. To additionally reduce the security-related bandwidth overhead, we propose the use of cumulative message authentication at time instances when the integrity of messages from subsets of sensors should be ensured. Furthermore, we introduce a method for the opportunistic use of the remaining resources to further improve the overall QoC guarantees while ensuring system (i.e., task and message) schedulability. Finally, we demonstrate applicability and scalability of our methodology on synthetic automotive systems as well as a real-world automotive case-study. 

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