In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), it is challenging for a collection of agents to learn complex temporally extended tasks. The difficulties lie in computational complexity and how to learn the high-level ideas behind reward functions. We study the graph-based Markov Decision Process (MDP), where the dynamics of neighboring agents are coupled. To learn complex temporally extended tasks, we use a reward machine (RM) to encode each agent’s task and expose reward function internal structures. RM has the capacity to describe high-level knowledge and encode non-Markovian reward functions. We propose a decentralized learning algorithm to tackle computational complexity, called decentralized graph-based reinforcement learning using reward machines (DGRM), that equips each agent with a localized policy, allowing agents to make decisions independently based on the information available to the agents. DGRM uses the actor-critic structure, and we introduce the tabular Q-function for discrete state problems. We show that the dependency of the Q-function on other agents decreases exponentially as the distance between them increases. To further improve efficiency, we also propose the deep DGRM algorithm, using deep neural networks to approximate the Q-function and policy function to solve large-scale or continuous state problems. The effectiveness of the proposed DGRM algorithm is evaluated by three case studies, two wireless communication case studies with independent and dependent reward functions, respectively, and COVID-19 pandemic mitigation. Experimental results show that local information is sufficient for DGRM and agents can accomplish complex tasks with the help of RM. DGRM improves the global accumulated reward by 119% compared to the baseline in the case of COVID-19 pandemic mitigation.
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This content will become publicly available on June 27, 2024
Reward Poisoning Attacks on Offline Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
In offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents estimate policies from a given dataset. We study reward-poisoning attacks in this setting where an exogenous attacker modifies the rewards in the dataset before the agents see the dataset. The attacker wants to guide each agent into a nefarious target policy while minimizing the Lp norm of the reward modification. Unlike attacks on single-agent RL, we show that the attacker can install the target policy as a Markov Perfect Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (MPDSE), which rational agents are guaranteed to follow. This attack can be significantly cheaper than separate single-agent attacks. We show that the attack works on various MARL agents including uncertainty-aware learners, and we exhibit linear programs to efficiently solve the attack problem. We also study the relationship between the structure of the datasets and the minimal attack cost. Our work paves the way for studying defense in offline MARL.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1955997
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10435474
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Volume:
- 37
- Issue:
- 9
- ISSN:
- 2159-5399
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 10426 to 10434
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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