We built an integrated solid-contact ion-selective electrode (SCISE) system with the functionality of self-calibration. A multiplexed SCISE sensor (K+ and NO3− vs. Ag/AgCl) was fabricated on printed-circuit board (PCB) substrates and was subsequently embedded into a microfluidic flow cell for self-calibration and flow-through analysis. A PCB circuit that includes modules for both sensor readout and fluid control was developed. The sensors showed a fast and near-Nernstian response (56.6 for the K+ electrode and −57.4 mV/dec for the NO3− electrode) and maintained their performance for at least three weeks. The sensors also showed a highly reproducible response in an automated two-point calibration, demonstrating the potential for in situ monitoring. Lastly, the sensor system was successfully applied to measure mineral nutrients in plant sap samples.
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PCB Security Modules for Reverse-Engineering Resistant Design
As the crisis of confidence and trust in overseas foundries arises, the industry and academic community are paying increasing attention to Printed Circuit Board (PCB) security. PCB, the backbone of any electronic system hardware, always draws attackers’ attention as it carries system and design information. Numerous ways of PCB tampering (e.g., adding/replacing a component, eavesdropping on a trace and bypassing a connection) can lead to more severe problems, such as Intellectual Property (IP) violation, password leaking, the Internet of Things (IoT) attacks or even more. This paper proposes a technique of active self-defense PCB modules with zero performance overhead. Those protection modules will only be activated when the boards are exposed to the attacks. A set of PCBs with proposed protection modules is fabricated and tested to prove the effectiveness and efficiency of the techniques.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1916756
- PAR ID:
- 10440883
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Journal of High Speed Electronics and Systems
- Volume:
- 32
- Issue:
- 02n04
- ISSN:
- 0129-1564
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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