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Title: Provable Adversarial Safety in Cyber-Physical Systems
Most proposals for securing control systems are heuristic in nature, and while they increase the protection of their target, the security guarantees they provide are unclear. This paper proposes a new way of modeling the security guarantees of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) against arbitrary false command attacks. As our main case study, we use the most popular testbed for control systems security. We first propose a detailed formal model of this testbed and then show how the original configuration is vulnerable to a single-actuator attack. We then propose modifications to the control system and prove that our modified system is secure against arbitrary, single-actuator attacks.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1929410 2111688
NSF-PAR ID:
10470118
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
IEEE
Date Published:
ISSN:
978-1-6654-6512-0
Page Range / eLocation ID:
979 to 1012
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Delft, Netherlands
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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