A core tension in the operations of online marketplaces is between segmentation (wherein platforms can increase revenue by segmenting the market into ever smaller sub-markets) and thickness (wherein the size of the sub-market affects the utility experienced by an agent). An important example of this is in dynamic online marketplaces, where buyers and sellers, in addition to preferences for different matches, also have finite patience (or deadlines) for being matched. We formalize this trade-off via a novel optimization problem that we term as 'Two-sided Facility Location': we consider a market wherein agents arrive at nodes embedded in an underlying metric space, where the distance between a buyer and seller captures the quality of the corresponding match. The platform posts prices and wages at the nodes, and opens a set of virtual clearinghouses where agents are routed for matching. To ensure high match-quality, the platform imposes a distance constraint between an agent and its clearinghouse; to ensure thickness, the platform requires the flow to any clearinghouse be at least a pre-specified lower bound. Subject to these constraints, the goal of the platform is to maximize the social surplus subject to weak budget balance, i.e., profit being non-negative. Our work characterizes the complexity of this problem by providing both hardness results as well as algorithms for this setting; in particular, we present an algorithm that for any constant ε > 0 yields a (1 + ε ) approximation for the gains from trade, while relaxing the match quality (i.e., maximum distance of any match) by a constant factor.
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Competition, Alignment, and Equilibria in Digital Marketplaces
Competition between traditional platforms is known to improve user utility by aligning the platform's actions with user preferences. But to what extent is alignment exhibited in data-driven marketplaces? To study this question from a theoretical perspective, we introduce a duopoly market where platform actions are bandit algorithms and the two platforms compete for user participation. A salient feature of this market is that the quality of recommendations depends on both the bandit algorithm and the amount of data provided by interactions from users. This interdependency between the algorithm performance and the actions of users complicates the structure of market equilibria and their quality in terms of user utility. Our main finding is that competition in this market does not perfectly align market outcomes with user utility. Interestingly, market outcomes exhibit misalignment not only when the platforms have separate data repositories, but also when the platforms have a shared data repository. Nonetheless, the data sharing assumptions impact what mechanism drives misalignment and also affect the specific form of misalignment (e.g. the quality of the best-case and worst-case market outcomes). More broadly, our work illustrates that competition in digital marketplaces has subtle consequences for user utility that merit further investigation.
more » « less- Award ID(s):
- 2145898
- PAR ID:
- 10482191
- Publisher / Repository:
- AAAI
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Volume:
- 37
- Issue:
- 5
- ISSN:
- 2159-5399
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 5689 to 5696
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25706
