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  • Explaining the description-experience gap in risky decision-making: learning and memory retention during experience as causal mechanisms
Title: Explaining the description-experience gap in risky decision-making: learning and memory retention during experience as causal mechanisms
When making decisions based on probabilistic outcomes, people guide their behavior using knowledge gathered through both indirect descriptions and direct experience. Paradoxically, how people obtain information significantly impacts apparent preferences. A ubiquitous example is the description-experience gap: individuals seemingly overweight low probability events when probabilities are described yet underweight them when probabilities must be experienced firsthand. A leading explanation for this fundamental gap in decision-making is that probabilities are weighted differently when learned through description relative to experience, yet a formal theoretical account of the mechanism responsible for such weighting differences remains elusive. We demonstrate how various learning and memory retention models incorporating neuroscientifically motivated learning mechanisms can explain why probability weighting and valuation parameters often are found to vary across description and experience. In a simulation study, we show how learning through experience can lead to systematically biased estimates of probability weighting when using a traditional cumulative prospect theory model. We then use hierarchical Bayesian modeling and Bayesian model comparison to show how various learning and memory retention models capture participants’ behavior over and above changes in outcome valuation and probability weighting, accounting for description and experience-based decisions in a within-subject experiment. We conclude with a discussion of how substantive models of psychological processes can lead to insights that heuristic statistical models fail to capture.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2237119 1847603
PAR ID:
10494248
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Springer
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience
Volume:
23
Issue:
3
ISSN:
1530-7026
Page Range / eLocation ID:
557 to 577
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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