This content will become publicly available on March 27, 2025
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have experienced rapid growth in recent decades. However, like any other computer-based systems, malicious attacks evolve mutually, driving CPS to undesirable physical states and potentially causing catastrophes. Although the current state-of-the-art is well aware of this issue, the majority of researchers have not focused on CPS recovery, the procedure we defined as restoring a CPS’s physical state back to a target condition under adversarial attacks. To call for attention on CPS recovery and identify existing efforts, we have surveyed a total of 30 relevant papers. We identify a major partition of the proposed recovery strategies: shallow recovery vs. deep recovery, where the former does not use a dedicated recovery controller while the latter does. Additionally, we surveyed exploratory research on topics that facilitate recovery. From these publications, we discuss the current state-of-the-art of CPS recovery, with respect to applications, attack type, attack surfaces and system dynamics. Then, we identify untouched sub-domains in this field and suggest possible future directions for researchers.
more » « less- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10499406
- Publisher / Repository:
- ACM
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- ACM Computing Surveys
- ISSN:
- 0360-0300
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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