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Studies of eco‐evolutionary dynamics have integrated evolution with ecological processes at multiple scales (populations, communities and ecosystems) and with multiple interspecific interactions (antagonistic, mutualistic and competitive). However, evolution has often been conceptualised as a simple process: short‐term directional adaptation that increases population growth. Here we argue that diverse other evolutionary processes, well studied in population genetics and evolutionary ecology, should also be considered to explore the full spectrum of feedback between ecological and evolutionary processes. Relevant but underappreciated processes include (1) drift and mutation, (2) disruptive selection causing lineage diversification or speciation reversal and (3) evolution driven by relative fitness differences that may decrease population growth. Because eco‐evolutionary dynamics have often been studied by population and community ecologists, it will be important to incorporate a variety of concepts in population genetics and evolutionary ecology to better understand and predict eco‐evolutionary dynamics in nature.
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Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Environmental Feedback in a Network with Two Communities
Abstract Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying population dynamics in various manners. We propose and analyze an eco-evolutionary game dynamics model on a network with two communities such that players interact with other players in the same community and those in the opposite community at different rates. In our model, we consider two-person matrix games with pairwise interactions occurring on individual edges and assume that the environmental state depends on edges rather than on nodes or being globally shared in the population. We analytically determine the equilibria and their stability under a symmetric population structure assumption, and we also numerically study the replicator dynamics of the general model. The model shows rich dynamical behavior, such as multiple transcritical bifurcations, multistability, and anti-synchronous oscillations. Our work offers insights into understanding how the presence of community structure impacts the eco-evolutionary dynamics within and between niches.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2052720
- PAR ID:
- 10513040
- Publisher / Repository:
- Springer Science + Business Media
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
- Volume:
- 86
- Issue:
- 7
- ISSN:
- 0092-8240
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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