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Title: Redundancy of Unbounded Memory Markov Classes with Continuity Conditions
Full version with complete proofs attached. Please email NS (email in paper) for other versions if desired.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1619452
PAR ID:
10571657
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Publisher / Repository:
IEEE
Date Published:
ISBN:
978-1-5386-4781-3
Page Range / eLocation ID:
211 to 215
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Vail, CO, USA
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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