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Free, publicly-accessible full text available July 1, 2025
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We devise an online learning algorithm -- titled Switching via Monotone Adapted Regret Traces (SMART) -- that adapts to the data and achieves regret that is instance optimal, i.e., simultaneously competitive on every input sequence compared to the performance of the follow-the-leader (FTL) policy and the worst case guarantee of any other input policy. We show that the regret of the SMART policy on any input sequence is within a multiplicative factor e/(e−1)≈1.58 of the smaller of: 1) the regret obtained by FTL on the sequence, and 2) the upper bound on regret guaranteed by the given worst-case policy. This implies a strictly stronger guarantee than typical `best-of-both-worlds' bounds as the guarantee holds for every input sequence regardless of how it is generated. SMART is simple to implement as it begins by playing FTL and switches at most once during the time horizon to the worst-case algorithm. Our approach and results follow from an operational reduction of instance optimal online learning to competitive analysis for the ski-rental problem. We complement our competitive ratio upper bounds with a fundamental lower bound showing that over all input sequences, no algorithm can get better than a 1.43-fraction of the minimum regret achieved by FTL and the minimax-optimal policy. We also present a modification of SMART that combines FTL with a ``small-loss" algorithm to achieve instance optimality between the regret of FTL and the small loss regret bound.more » « lessFree, publicly-accessible full text available July 1, 2025
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Abstract Many neurodegenerative diseases including frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD), Lewy body disease (LBD), multiple system atrophy (MSA), etc., show colocalized deposits of TDP-43 and α-synuclein (αS) aggregates. To understand whether these colocalizations are driven by specific molecular interactions between the two proteins, we previously showed that the prion-like C-terminal domain of TDP-43 (TDP-43PrLD) and αS synergistically interact to form neurotoxic heterotypic amyloids in homogeneous buffer conditions. However, it remains unclear if αS can modulate TDP-43 present within liquid droplets and biomolecular condensates called stress granules (SGs). Here, using cell culture and in vitro TDP-43PrLD – RNA liquid droplets as models along with microscopy, nanoscale AFM-IR spectroscopy, and biophysical analyses, we uncover the interactions of αS with phase-separated droplets. We learn that αS acts as a Pickering agent by forming clusters on the surface of TDP-43PrLD – RNA droplets. The aggregates of αS on these clusters emulsify the droplets by nucleating the formation of heterotypic TDP-43PrLD amyloid fibrils, structures of which are distinct from those derived from homogenous solutions. Together, these results reveal an intriguing property of αS to act as a Pickering agent while interacting with SGs and unmask the hitherto unknown role of αS in modulating TDP-43 proteinopathies.
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We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of N agents over a sequence of T rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round, and every agent reveals their value for it upon arrival. The algorithm must irrevocably decide the investment in this good without exceeding a total budget of B across all rounds. The algorithm can utilize (potentially noisy) predictions of each agent’s total value for all remaining goods. The algorithm’s performance is measured using a proportional fairness objective, which informally demands that every group of agents be rewarded proportional to its size and the cohesiveness of its preferences. We show that no algorithm can achieve better than Θ(T/B) proportional fairness without predictions. With reasonably accurate predictions, the situation improves significantly, and Θ(log(T/B)) proportional fairness is achieved. We also extend our results to a general setting wherein a batch of L public goods arrive in each round and O(log(min(N,L) ·T/B)) proportional fairness is achieved. Our exact bounds are parameterized as a function of the prediction error, with performance degrading gracefully with increasing errors.more » « less
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We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and the decision-maker must commit to an allocation for these individuals before moving on to the next round. In contrast to prior work, we consider a setting in which resources are perishable and individuals' utilities are potentially non-linear (e.g., goods exhibit complementarities). The goal is to construct a sequence of allocations that is envy-free and efficient. We design an algorithm that takes as input (i) a prediction of the perishing order, and (ii) a desired bound on envy. Given the remaining budget in each period, the algorithm uses forecasts of future demand and perishing to adaptively choose one of two carefully constructed guardrail quantities. We characterize conditions under which our algorithm achieves the optimal envy-efficiency Pareto frontier. We moreover demonstrate its strong numerical performance using data from a partnering food bank.more » « less
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We design online algorithms for fair allocation of public goods to a set of N agents over a sequence of T rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round, and every agent reveals their value for it upon arrival. The algorithm must irrevocably decide the investment in this good without exceeding a total budget of B across all rounds. The algorithm can utilize (potentially noisy) predictions of each agent’s total value for all remaining goods. The algorithm's performance is measured using a proportional fairness objective, which informally demands that every group of agents be rewarded proportional to its size and the cohesiveness of its preferences. We show that no algorithm can achieve better than Θ(T/B) proportional fairness without predictions. With reasonably accurate predictions, the situation improves significantly, and Θ(log(T/B)) proportional fairness is achieved. We also extend our results to a general setting wherein a batch of L public goods arrive in each round and O(log(min(N,L)T/B)) proportional fairness is achieved. Our exact bounds are parameterized as a function of the prediction error, with performance degrading gracefully with increasing errors.