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The increasing automation of high-stakes decisions with direct impact on the lives and well-being of individuals raises a number of important considerations. Prominent among these is strategic behavior by individuals hoping to achieve a more desirable outcome. Two forms of such behavior are commonly studied: 1) misreporting of individual attributes, and 2) recourse, or actions that truly change such attributes. The former involves deception, and is inherently undesirable, whereas the latter may well be a desirable goal insofar as it changes true individual qualification. We study misreporting and recourse as strategic choices by individuals within a unified framework. In particular, we propose auditing as a means to incentivize recourse actions over attribute manipulation, and characterize optimal audit policies for two types of principals, utility-maximizing and recourse-maximizing. Additionally, we consider subsidies as an incentive for recourse over manipulation, and show that even a utility-maximizing principal would be willing to devote a considerable amount of audit budget to providing such subsidies. Finally, we consider the problem of optimizing fines for failed audits, and bound the total cost incurred by the population as a result of audits. 

Given an algorithmic predictor that is accurate on some source population consisting of strategic human decision subjects, will it remain accurate if the population respond to it? In our setting, an agent or a user corresponds to a sample (X,Y) drawn from a distribution  and will face a model h and its classification result h(X). Agents can modify X to adapt to h, which will incur a distribution shift on (X,Y). Our formulation is motivated by applications where the deployed machine learning models are subjected to human agents, and will ultimately face responsive and interactive data distributions. We formalize the discussions of the transferability of a model by studying how the performance of the model trained on the available source distribution (data) would translate to the performance on its induced domain. We provide both upper bounds for the performance gap due to the induced domain shift, as well as lower bounds for the trade-offs that a classifier has to suffer on either the source training distribution or the induced target distribution. We provide further instantiated analysis for two popular domain adaptation settings, including covariate shift and target shift. 

The pursuit of long-term fairness involves the interplay between decision-making and the underlying data generating process. In this paper, through causal modeling with a directed acyclic graph (DAG) on the decision-distribution interplay, we investigate the possibility of achieving long-term fairness from a dynamic perspective. We propose Tier Balancing, a technically more challenging but more natural notion to achieve in the context of long-term, dynamic fairness analysis. Different from previous fairness notions that are defined purely on observed variables, our notion goes one step further, capturing behind-the-scenes situation changes on the unobserved latent causal factors that directly carry out the influence from the current decision to the future data distribution. Under the specified dynamics, we prove that in general one cannot achieve the long-term fairness goal only through one-step interventions. Furthermore, in the effort of approaching long-term fairness, we consider the mission of "getting closer to" the long-term fairness goal and present possibility and impossibility results accordingly. 

The increasing automation of high-stakes decisions with direct impact on the lives and well-being of individuals raises a number of important considerations. Prominent among these is strategic behavior by individuals hoping to achieve a more desirable outcome. Two forms of such behavior are commonly studied: 1) misreporting of individual attributes, and 2) recourse, or actions that truly change such attributes. The former involves deception, and is inherently undesirable, whereas the latter may well be a desirable goal insofar as it changes true individual qualification. We study misreporting and recourse as strategic choices by individuals within a unified framework. In particular, we propose auditing as a means to incentivize recourse actions over attribute manipulation, and characterize optimal audit policies for two types of principals, utility-maximizing and recourse-maximizing. Additionally, we consider subsidies as an incentive for recourse over manipulation, and show that even a utility-maximizing principal would be willing to devote a considerable amount of audit budget to providing such subsidies. Finally, we consider the problem of optimizing fines for failed audits, and bound the total cost incurred by the population as a result of audits. 

We study the problem of classifier derandomization in machine learning: given a stochastic binary classifier f:X→[0,1], sample a deterministic classifier f̂ :X→{0,1} that approximates the output of f in aggregate over any data distribution. Recent work revealed how to efficiently derandomize a stochastic classifier with strong output approximation guarantees, but at the cost of individual fairness -- that is, if f treated similar inputs similarly, f̂ did not. In this paper, we initiate a systematic study of classifier derandomization with metric fairness guarantees. We show that the prior derandomization approach is almost maximally metric-unfair, and that a simple ``random threshold'' derandomization achieves optimal fairness preservation but with weaker output approximation. We then devise a derandomization procedure that provides an appealing tradeoff between these two: if f is α-metric fair according to a metric d with a locality-sensitive hash (LSH) family, then our derandomized f̂ is, with high probability, O(α)-metric fair and a close approximation of f. We also prove generic results applicable to all (fair and unfair) classifier derandomization procedures, including a bias-variance decomposition and reductions between various notions of metric fairness. 

Given an algorithmic predictor that is "fair" on some source distribution, will it still be fair on an unknown target distribution that differs from the source within some bound? In this paper, we study the transferability of statistical group fairness for machine learning predictors (i.e., classifiers or regressors) subject to bounded distribution shifts. Such shifts may be introduced by initial training data uncertainties, user adaptation to a deployed predictor, dynamic environments, or the use of pre-trained models in new settings. Herein, we develop a bound that characterizes such transferability, flagging potentially inappropriate deployments of machine learning for socially consequential tasks. We first develop a framework for bounding violations of statistical fairness subject to distribution shift, formulating a generic upper bound for transferred fairness violations as our primary result. We then develop bounds for specific worked examples, focusing on two commonly used fairness definitions (i.e., demographic parity and equalized odds) and two classes of distribution shift (i.e., covariate shift and label shift). Finally, we compare our theoretical bounds to deterministic models of distribution shift and against real-world data, finding that we are able to estimate fairness violation bounds in practice, even when simplifying assumptions are only approximately satisfied.