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Reusable software libraries, frameworks, and components, such as those provided by open source ecosystems and third-party suppliers, accelerate digital innovation. However, recent years have shown almost exponential growth in attackers leveraging these software artifacts to launch software supply chain attacks. Past well-known software supply chain attacks include the SolarWinds, log4j, and xz utils incidents. Supply chain attacks are considered to have three major attack vectors: through vulnerabilities and malware accidentally or intentionally injected into open source and third-partydependencies/components/containers; by infiltrating thebuild infrastructureduring the build and deployment processes; and through targeted techniques aimed at thehumansinvolved in software development, such as through social engineering. Plummeting trust in the software supply chain could decelerate digital innovation if the software industry reduces its use of open source and third-party artifacts to reduce risks. This article contains perspectives and knowledge obtained from intentional outreach with practitioners to understand their practical challenges and from extensive research efforts. We then provide an overview of current research efforts to secure the software supply chain. Finally, we propose a future research agenda to close software supply chain attack vectors and support the software industry. 

Existing research has primarily delved into the realm of computer science outreach aimed at K-12 students, with a focus on both informal and non-formal approaches. However, a noticeable research gap exists when it comes to cybersecurity outreach tailored specifically for underserved secondary school students. This article addresses this void by presenting an iterative pilot of a cybersecurity curriculum. This innovative curriculum integrates a one-week summer camp and a series of 1.5-hour workshops designed to provide students with a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity. The overarching goal of this approach is to foster wider participation in the field of computing, particularly in the realm of cybersecurity. This research aims to spark interest among students who may currently face limited access to computing resources. The cybersecurity lessons featured in this curriculum adhere to the standards set by Cyber.org, an organization supported by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA). Key topics covered include networking, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad, and operating system security. This paper not only outlines the process of creating and implementing these cybersecurity lessons but also emphasizes the iterative refinement process they underwent. The discussion primarily revolves around the valuable insights gained from implementing this curriculum at two prominent public universities in the eastern United States. By bridging the research gap and focusing on practical applications, this initiative contributes significantly to the broader discourse on cybersecurity education for underserved secondary school students. 

Recent years have shown increased cyber attacks targeting less secure elements in the software supply chain and causing fatal damage to businesses and organizations. Past well-known examples of software supply chain attacks are the SolarWinds or log4j incidents that have affected thousands of customers and businesses. The US government and industry are equally interested in enhancing software supply chain security. On June 7, 2023, researchers from the NSF-supported Secure Software Supply Chain Center (S3C2) conducted a Secure Software Supply Chain Summit with the diverse set of 17 practitioners from 13 government agencies. The goal of the Summit was two-fold: (1) to share our observations from our previous two summits with industry, and (2) to enable sharing between individuals at the government agencies regarding practical experiences and challenges with software supply chain security. For each discussion topic, we presented our observations and take-aways from the industry summits to spur conversation. We specifically focused on the Executive Order 14028, software bill of materials (SBOMs), choosing new dependencies, provenance and self-attestation, and large language models. The open discussions enabled mutual sharing and shed light on common challenges that government agencies see as impacting government and industry practitioners when securing their software supply chain. In this paper, we provide a summary of the Summit. 

Recent years have shown increased cyber attacks targeting less secure elements in the software supply chain and causing fatal damage to businesses and organizations. Past well-known examples of software supply chain attacks are the SolarWinds or log4j incidents that have affected thousands of customers and businesses. The US government and industry are equally interested in enhancing soft- ware supply chain security. On February 22, 2023, researchers from the NSF-supported Secure Software Supply Chain Center (S3C2) conducted a Secure Software Supply Chain Summit with a diverse set of 17 practitioners from 15 companies. The goal of the Summit is to enable sharing between industry practitioners having practical experiences and challenges with software supply chain security and helping to form new collaborations. We conducted six-panel discussions based upon open-ended questions regarding software bill of materials (SBOMs), malicious commits, choosing new dependencies, build and deploy, the Executive Order 14028, and vulnerable dependencies. The open discussions enabled mutual sharing and shed light on common challenges that industry practitioners with practical experience face when securing their software supply chain. In this paper, we provide a summary of the Summit. 

Recent years have shown increased cyber attacks targeting less secure elements in the software supply chain and causing fatal damage to businesses and organizations. Past well-known examples of software supply chain attacks are the SolarWinds or log4j incidents that have affected thousands of customers and businesses. The US government and industry are equally interested in enhancing software supply chain security. We conducted six panel discussions with a diverse set of 19 practitioners from industry. We asked them open-ended questions regarding SBOMs, vulnerable dependencies, malicious commits, build and deploy, the Executive Order, and standards compliance. The goal of this summit was to enable open discussions, mutual sharing, and shedding light on common challenges that industry practitioners with practical experience face when securing their software supply chain. This paper summarizes the summit held on September 30, 2022.