Search for: All records

Performative prediction, as introduced by Perdomo et al, is a framework for studying social prediction in which the data distribution itself changes in response to the deployment of a model. Existing work in this field usually hinges on three assumptions that are easily violated in practice: that the performative risk is convex over the deployed model, that the mapping from the model to the data distribution is known to the model designer in advance, and the first-order information of the performative risk is available. In this paper, we initiate the study of performative prediction problems that do not require these assumptions. Specifically, we develop a reparameterization framework that reparametrizes the performative prediction objective as a function of the induced data distribution. We then develop a two-level zeroth-order optimization procedure, where the first level performs iterative optimization on the distribution parameter space, and the second level learns the model that induces a particular target distribution at each iteration. Under mild conditions, this reparameterization allows us to transform the non-convex objective into a convex one and achieve provable regret guarantees. In particular, we provide a regret bound that is sublinear in the total number of performative samples taken and is only polynomial in the dimension of the model parameter. 

We study a natural competitive-information-design variant for the Pandora’s Box problem [31], where each box is associated with a strategic information sender who can design what information about the box’s prize value to be revealed to the agent when she inspects the box. This variant with strategic boxes is motivated by a wide range of real-world economic applications for Pandora’s box. The main contributions of this article are two-fold: (1) we study informational properties of Pandora’s Box by analyzing how a box’s partial information revelation affects the search agent’s optimal decisions; and (2) we fully characterize the pure symmetric equilibrium for the boxes’ competitive information revelation, which reveals various insights regarding information competition and the resultant agent utility at equilibrium.