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Creators/Authors contains: "Kamhoua, Charles"

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  1. Free, publicly-accessible full text available March 19, 2026
  2. Free, publicly-accessible full text available March 28, 2026
  3. Poupart, Pascal (Ed.)
    Incentive design, also known as model design or environment design for Markov decision processes(MDPs), refers to a class of problems in which a leader can incentivize his follower by modifying the follower's reward function, in anticipation that the follower's optimal policy in the resulting MDP can be desirable for the leader's objective. In this work, we propose gradient-ascent algorithms to compute the leader's optimal incentive design, despite the lack of knowledge about the follower's reward function. First, we formulate the incentive design problem as a bi-level optimization problem and demonstrate that, by the softmax temporal consistency between the follower's policy and value function, the bi-level optimization problem can be reduced to single-level optimization, for which a gradient-based algorithm can be developed to optimize the leader's objective. We establish several key properties of incentive design in MDPs and prove the convergence of the proposed gradient-based method. Next, we show that the gradient terms can be estimated from observations of the follower's best response policy, enabling the use of a stochastic gradient-ascent algorithm to compute a locally optimal incentive design without knowing or learning the follower's reward function. Finally, we analyze the conditions under which an incentive design remains optimal for two different rewards which are policy invariant. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated using a small probabilistic transition system and a stochastic gridworld. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available March 28, 2026
  4. Fu, J. (Ed.)
  5. Over the years, honeypots emerged as an important security tool to understand attacker intent and deceive attackers to spend time and resources. Recently, honeypots are being deployed for Internet of things (IoT) devices to lure attackers, and learn their behavior. However, most of the existing IoT honeypots, even the high interaction ones, are easily detected by an attacker who can observe honeypot traffic due to lack of real network traffic originating from the honeypot. This implies that, to build better honeypots and enhance cyber deception capabilities, IoT honeypots need to generate realistic network traffic flows. To achieve this goal, we propose a novel deep learning based approach for generating traffic flows that mimic real network traffic due to user and IoT device interactions.A key technical challenge that our approach overcomes is scarcity of device-specific IoT traffic data to effectively train a generator.We address this challenge by leveraging a core generative adversarial learning algorithm for sequences along with domain specific knowledge common to IoT devices.Through an extensive experimental evaluation with 18 IoT devices, we demonstrate that the proposed synthetic IoT traffic generation tool significantly outperforms state of the art sequence and packet generators in remaining indistinguishable from real traffic even to an adaptive attacker. 
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  6. This letter focuses on the optimal allocation of multi-stage attacks with the uncertainty in attacker’s intention. We model the attack planning problem using a Markov decision process and characterize the uncertainty in the attacker’s intention using a finite set of reward functions—each reward represents a type of attacker. Based on this modeling, we employ the paradigm of the worst-case absolute regret minimization from robust game theory and develop mixed-integer linear program (MILP) formulations for solving the worst-case regret minimizing sensor allocation strategies for two classes of attack-defend interactions: one where the defender and attacker engage in a zero-sum game and another where they engage in a non-zero-sum game. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm using a stochastic gridworld example. 
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