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Free, publicly-accessible full text available October 1, 2025
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Zhang, Mengke ; He, Tianxing ; Wang, Tianle ; Mi, Lu ; Mireshghallah, Niloofar ; Chen, Binyi ; Wang, Hao ; Tsvetkov, Yulia ( , NAACL)In the current user-server interaction paradigm of prompted generation with large language models (LLMs) on cloud, the server fully controls the generation process, which leaves zero options for users who want to keep the generated text private to themselves. For privacy-aware text generation on cloud, we propose LatticeGen, a cooperative protocol in which the server still handles most of the computation while the client controls the sampling operation. The key idea is that the true generated sequence is mixed with noise tokens by the client and hidden in a noised lattice. Only the client knows which tokens are the true ones. Considering potential attacks from a hypothetically malicious server and how the client can defend against it, we propose the repeated beam-search attack and the mixing noise scheme. In our experiments we apply LatticeGen to protect both prompt and generation. It is shown that while the noised lattice degrades generation quality, LatticeGen successfully protects the true generation to a remarkable degree under strong attacks (more than 50{\%} of the semantic remains hidden as measured by BERTScore).more » « lessFree, publicly-accessible full text available June 28, 2025
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Mireshghallah, Niloofar ; Kim, Hyunwoo ; Zhou, Xuhui ; Tsvetkov, Yulia ; Sap, Maarten ; Shokri, Reza ; Choi, Yejin ( , International Conference on Learning Representations)Existing efforts on quantifying privacy implications for large language models (LLMs) solely focus on measuring leakage of training data. In this work, we shed light on the often-overlooked interactive settings where an LLM receives information from multiple sources and generates an output to be shared with other entities, creating the potential of exposing sensitive input data in inappropriate contexts. In these scenarios, humans nat- urally uphold privacy by choosing whether or not to disclose information depending on the context. We ask the question “Can LLMs demonstrate an equivalent discernment and reasoning capability when considering privacy in context?” We propose CONFAIDE, a benchmark grounded in the theory of contextual integrity and designed to identify critical weaknesses in the privacy reasoning capabilities of instruction-tuned LLMs. CONFAIDE consists of four tiers, gradually increasing in complexity, with the final tier evaluating contextual privacy reasoning and theory of mind capabilities. Our experiments show that even commercial models such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT reveal private information in contexts that humans would not, 39% and 57% of the time, respectively, highlighting the urgent need for a new direction of privacy-preserving approaches as we demonstrate a larger underlying problem stemmed in the models’ lack of reasoning capabilities.more » « lessFree, publicly-accessible full text available May 15, 2025