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Abstract The potential impact of autonomous robots on everyday life is evident in emerging applications such as precision agriculture, search and rescue, and infrastructure inspection. However, such applications necessitate operation in unknown and unstructured environments with a broad and sophisticated set of objectives, all under strict computation and power limitations. We therefore argue that the computational kernels enabling robotic autonomy must bescheduledandoptimizedto guarantee timely and correct behavior, while allowing for reconfiguration of scheduling parameters at runtime. In this paper, we consider a necessary first step towards this goal ofcomputational awarenessin autonomous robots: an empirical study of a base set of computational kernels from the resource management perspective. Specifically, we conduct a data-driven study of the timing, power, and memory performance of kernels for localization and mapping, path planning, task allocation, depth estimation, and optical flow, across three embedded computing platforms. We profile and analyze these kernels to provide insight into scheduling and dynamic resource management for computation-aware autonomous robots. Notably, our results show that there is a correlation of kernel performance with a robot’s operational environment, justifying the notion of computation-aware robots and why our work is a crucial step towards this goal. 

The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a ubiquitous bus protocol present in the Electrical/Electronic (E/E) systems of almost all vehicles. It is vulnerable to a range of attacks once the attacker gains access to the bus through the vehicle’s attack surface. We address the problem of Intrusion Detection on the CAN bus and present a series of methods based on two classifiers trained with Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Network (ACGAN) to detect and assign fine-grained labels to Known Attacks and also detect the Unknown Attack class in a dataset containing a mixture of (Normal + Known Attacks + Unknown Attack) messages. The most effective method is a cascaded two-stage classification architecture, with the multi-class Auxiliary Classifier in the first stage for classification of Normal and Known Attacks, passing Out-of-Distribution (OOD) samples to the binary Real-Fake Classifier in the second stage for detection of the Unknown Attack class. Performance evaluation demonstrates that our method achieves both high classification accuracy and low runtime overhead, making it suitable for deployment in the resource-constrained in-vehicle environment.